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Concern has recently been expressed in a variety of quarters that the prob-
lems facing central banks may be substantially complicated by the increasing 
globalization of goods markets, factor markets, and ﬁ  nancial markets in 
recent years. Some of the more alarmist views suggest that the very ability 
of national central banks to materially inﬂ  uence the dynamics of inﬂ  ation 
in their countries through monetary policy actions may be undermined by 
globalization. According to such accounts, the recently observed low and 
stable inﬂ  ation in many parts of the world should be attributed mainly to 
favorable (and likely transient) global developments rather than to the sound 
policies of central banks in those parts of the world; and rather than con-
gratulating themselves on how skilled they have become at the conduct of 
monetary stabilization policy, central bankers should instead live in dread 
of the day when the implacable global market forces instead turn against 
them, making a return of inﬂ  ation all but inevitable.
In this chapter I consider a variety of reasons why globalization might 
be expected to weaken the control of national central banks over inﬂ  a-
tion within their borders. These correspond to three distinct aspects of the 
transmission mechanism for monetary policy: the link between central- bank 
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model, the extent to which it is possible for central bank policy to shift the 
“LM curve”); the link between real interest rates and the balance between 
saving and investment in the economy (described by the “IS curve”); and 
the link between variations in domestic real activity and inﬂ  ation (described 
by the “AS curve”).
On the one hand, it might be thought that in a globalized world, it is 
“global liquidity” that should determine world interest rates rather than the 
supply of liquidity by a single central bank (especially a small one); thus, one 
might fear that a small central bank will no longer have any instrument with 
which to shift the LM curve. Alternatively, it might be thought that changes 
in the balance between investment and saving in one country should matter 
little for the common world level of real interest rates, so that the “IS curve” 
should become perfectly horizontal even if the LM curve could be shifted. 
It might then be feared that loss of control over domestic real interest rates 
would eliminate any leverage of domestic monetary policy over domestic 
spending or inﬂ  ation. Or as still another possibility, it might be thought that 
inﬂ  ation should cease to depend on economic slack in one country alone 
(especially a small one), but rather upon “global slack.” In this case the AS 
curve would become horizontal, implying that even if domestic monetary 
policy can be eﬀectively used to control domestic aggregate demand, this 
might not allow any control over domestic inﬂ  ation.
I take up each of these possibilities by discussing the eﬀects of openness 
(of goods markets, of factor markets, and of ﬁ  nancial markets) on each of 
these three parts of a “new Keynesian” model of the monetary transmission 
mechanism. I ﬁ  rst consider each argument in the context of a canonical 
open economy monetary model (following the exposition by Clarida, Galí, 
and Gertler [2002]), and show that openness need not have any of the kinds 
of eﬀects that I have just proposed. In each case, I also consider possible 
variants of the standard model in which the eﬀects of globalization might 
be more extreme. These cases are not always intended to be regarded as 
especially realistic, but are taken up in an eﬀort to determine if there are 
conditions under which the fear of globalization would be justiﬁ  ed. Yet I 
ﬁ  nd it diﬃcult to construct scenarios under which globalization would inter-
fere in any substantial way with the ability of domestic monetary policy to 
maintain control over the dynamics of domestic inﬂ  ation.
It is true that in a globalized economy, foreign developments will be 
among the sources of economic disturbances to which it will be appropri-
ate for a central bank to respond in order for it to achieve its stabilization 
goals. But there is little reason to fear that the capacity of national central 
banks to stabilize domestic inﬂ  ation—without having to rely upon coor-
dinated action with other central banks—will be weakened by increasing 
openness of national economies. Thus it will continue to be appropriate to 
hold national central banks responsible for domestic inﬂ  ation outcomes, 
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in the case of national central banks that have demonstrated vigilance in 
controlling inﬂ  ation thus far.
1.1      International Financial Integration and 
the Scope for National Monetary Policies
I shall ﬁ  rst consider the implications of the international integration of 
ﬁ  nancial markets for the monetary transmission mechanism. I consider this 
issue ﬁ  rst because there can be little doubt that ﬁ  nancial markets are already, 
to an important extent, global markets. The volume of cross-  border ﬁ  nan-
cial claims of all sorts has grown explosively over the past quarter century, 
and real interest rates in diﬀerent countries have been observed to be more 
strongly correlated as well (Kose et al. 2006).
It is sometimes argued that increased integration of international ﬁ  nan-
cial markets should imply that interest rates in each country will come to be 
determined largely by world conditions rather than domestic conditions. It 
is then feared that as a result, domestic monetary policy will come to have 
little leverage over domestic interest rates. Rogoﬀ (2006) suggests that this is 
already occurring, and argues that even large central banks like the Fed are 
able to aﬀect ﬁ  nancial markets as much as they do only thanks to the fact 
that many other central banks tend to follow their policy decisions. That is, 
Rogoﬀ argues that even though “individual central banks’ monetary policies 
matter less in a globalized world,” this “does not imply that central banks 
have less inﬂ  uence over real interest rates collectively” (272– 73). To the extent 
that this is true, it would seem to imply a substantial reduction in the ability 
of national central banks to use domestic monetary policy as an instrument 
of stabilization policy. It might be thought to present a strong argument for 
explicit agreements among central banks for the coordination of policy, and 
perhaps even for global monetary union. One might expect that especially in 
the case of a small country (that can have only a correspondingly small eﬀect 
on the global balance between investment and savings) domestic monetary 
policy should cease to be useful for controlling aggregate domestic expendi-
ture or domestic inﬂ  ation.
In this section of the chapter, I consider whether such inferences are 
valid by analyzing the connection between real interest rates and aggregate 
demand in a two- country model with fully integrated international ﬁ  nancial 
markets. Here I focus solely on the way in which equilibrium real interest 
rates must be consistent with the relation that exists between the economy’s 
time path of output on the one hand and the private sector’s preferences over 
alternative time paths of consumption on the other—the structural relations 
that correspond to the “IS curve” of a canonical closed-  economy model. I 
defer until the following section the question of how globalization might 
aﬀect the central bank’s ability to inﬂ  uence domestic interest rates owing to 
changes in the demand for central-  bank liabilities. For the moment, I shall 16    Michael  Woodford
take it for granted that a central bank is able to shift the “LM curve,” and 
ask how that aﬀects the aggregate demand curve; that is, the equilibrium 
relation between domestic inﬂ  ation and real expenditure.
1.1.1      Interest-  Rate Policy and Aggregate Demand 
in a Two-Country Model
I ﬁ  rst consider the “aggregate demand block” of a canonical two- country 
new-  Keynesian model, as expounded for example in Clarida, Galí, and 
Gertler (2002) (hereafter CGG).1 I consider ﬁ  rst the case of complete inter-
national ﬁ  nancial integration, so that there is even complete international 
risk sharing. Moreover, following CGG, I suppose that households in both 
countries consume the same basket of internationally traded goods. This 
extreme case has the implication that there is clearly a single real interest rate 
that is relevant to the intertemporal substitution decisions of households in 
both countries—the intertemporal relative price of the composite consump-
tion good that is consumed in both countries. This allows me to consider the 
implications of the equalization of real interest rates across borders in the 
case where the strongest possible result of this kind obtains.
Let us assume that each of two countries are made up of inﬁ  nite-  lived 
households, and that each household (in either country) has identical prefer-
ences over intertemporal consumption streams. Speciﬁ  cally, following CGG, 
let us assume that each household ranks consumption streams according to 
a utility function of the form2




where 0       1 is a discount factor,
(1.2)  u(C)   
C1   1
 
1     1,
is the period utility ﬂ  ow from consumption (where     0 is the constant 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumer expenditure), and Ct 
is an index of the household’s consumption of both domestically- produced 
and foreign-  produced goods. In particular, CGG assume that
(1.3)  Ct   CH
1
t
  C 
Ft,
where CHt represents an index of the household’s purchases of goods pro-
duced in the “home” country and CFt an index of purchases of goods pro-
1. Models with a similar structure have been extensively used in the recent literature on the 
analysis of monetary policy for open economies; see, for example, Svensson (2000), Benigno 
and Benigno (2001, 2005, 2006), or Gali and Monacelli (2005).
2. Here I specify only the way in which utility depends on consumption expenditure. The 
disutility of working and the liquidity services provided by money balances are assumed to 
contribute terms to the utility function that are additively separable from the terms included 
in (1.1); these extensions are discussed in sections 1.2 and 1.3.Globalization and Monetary Control    1 7
duced in the “foreign” country. Thus, there is assumed to be a unit elasticity 
of substitution between the two categories of goods, and 0       1 indicates 
the expenditure share of the foreign country’s goods in the consumption 
basket of households in either country. By considering the determination 
of aggregate demand in country H in the limit as   approaches 1, we can 
consider the consequences of globalization for a country that is small rela-
tive to world markets.
It is important to note that here an H subscript refers to purchases of goods 
produced in country H, by households in either country, and not purchases 
of goods produced in one’s own country; thus, a large value of   means that 
country H supplies most of the goods consumed worldwide, not that few 
imported goods are consumed in either country. Regardless of the value of 
 , the model describes a world with full integration of goods markets, in the 
sense that an identical basket of goods (all of which are traded on world 
markets) is consumed in both countries. I shall use variables without stars to 
denote the purchases of the representative household in country H, and the 
corresponding starred variables to denote the purchases of these same goods 
by the representative household in country F. Because preferences are the 
same in both countries, one has, for example, the relation Ct∗   CHt ∗1–   CFt ∗ .
Given preferences (1.3), intratemporal optimization implies that house-
holds in the home country allocate expenditure across domestic and foreign 
goods according to the relations
(1.4)  P HtCHt   (1    )P tCt,
(1.5)  P FtCFt    P tCt.
Here P Ht is an index of the prices charged in country H for domestic goods 
(speciﬁ  cally, the price of a unit of the composite good, the quantity of which 
is measured by CHt, in units of currency H), P Ft is a corresponding index of 
the prices charged in country H for foreign goods, and
(1.6)  Pt   k 1PHt
1  P 
Ft,
where k  (1 –    )1–     , is an index of the price of all consumer goods 
(including imported goods). Corresponding relations (for example, P∗
FtC∗
Ft 
   Pt∗Ct∗) hold for consumer expenditure in the foreign country, where the 
starred prices indicate price indices for the same baskets of goods in country 
F (and in terms of the foreign currency).
The existence of complete ﬁ  nancial markets implies the existence of a 
uniquely deﬁ  ned stochastic discount factor Qt,T that deﬁ  nes the present value 
in period t (in units of the domestic currency) of random income in period T 
  t (also in units of the domestic currency). Optimal allocation of consump-
tion expenditure over time and across states then implies that
(1.7)   
CT  
Ct
   1
   Qt,T
P T  
P t18    Michael  Woodford
for each possible state of the world at date T. Let it be the one- period riskless 
nominal interest rate in terms of the domestic currency; given (1.7), consis-
tency of this rate with the stochastic discount factor (that is, the absence of 
ﬁ  nancial arbitrage opportunities) requires that
(1.8) (1    it) 1    Et 
Ct 1  
Ct 
   1 P t  
P t 1.
This is the key equilibrium relation between the short- term nominal interest 
rate it controlled by the central bank of country H and aggregate expenditure 
in that country.3 The riskless one-  period real rate of return rt in country H 
must satisfy a corresponding relation
(1.9) (1    rt) 1    Et
Ct 1  
Ct 
   1
.
Finally, relations of exactly the same form relate the intertemporal con-
sumption allocation in the foreign country to asset prices there; equations 
corresponding to (1.7), (1.8), and (1.9) each hold, with each variable replaced 
by a corresponding starred variable.
The relations stated thus far would hold equally in the case of two closed-
  economy models, one for each country. (In that case of course, one would 
have to assume that both H goods and F goods are produced in each coun-
try.) Clarida, Galí, and Gertler further assume that each good is sold in a 
world market, and that the law of one price holds. Hence, one must have
P Ht   εtP∗
Ht,
P Ft   εtP∗
Ft,
and as a consequence
(1.10)  P t   εtPt∗
as well, where εt is the nominal exchange rate in period t. (Note that [1.10] 
depends not only on the validity of the law of one price, but also on the 
existence of identical consumption baskets in the two countries.) Similarly, 
complete international ﬁ  nancial integration (frictionless cross- border trade 
in all ﬁ  nancial assets) implies the relation





between the stochastic discount factors (and hence asset prices) in the two 
countries.
Conditions (1.10) and (1.11) together imply that
3. The means by which it is possible for the central bank to control this interest rate are 
discussed in the following section.Globalization and Monetary Control    1 9
(1.12)  Qt,T
P T  
P t





that is, the stochastic discount factors for real income streams must be identi-
cal in the two countries, and hence that
(1.13)  rt   rt∗.
Thus, real interest rates must be equalized in the two countries. In (1.13) the 
equality of short- term real rates is stated, but in fact, since the real stochastic 
discount factors are identical, the entire real term structure must be identical 
in the two countries. This is true regardless of the monetary policies pursued 
by the two national central banks.
However, this result does not depend on the hypothesis of complete inter-
national ﬁ  nancial integration. In fact, under the preference speciﬁ  cation 
assumed by CGG, an identical result would hold under the hypothesis of 
complete ﬁ  nancial autarchy. Let us suppose that there is a mass 1 –     of 
households in country H and a mass   in country F, so that income per 
household is the same in both countries (when expressed in units of the 
same currency). Under the assumption of ﬁ  nancial autarchy, trade must be 
balanced each period so that
(1    )P FtCFt    εtP∗
HtC∗
Ht.
Because expenditure is allocated to the two classes of goods in the shares 
indicated by (1.4) and (1.5), and the corresponding relations for households 
in country F, this implies that
P tCt   εtPt∗Ct∗.
It would then follow from (1.10) that Ct   Ct∗ each period. This in turn 
implies (given [1.7] and the corresponding relation for country F) that (1.12) 
must hold, and hence that the term structure of real interest rates must be 
the same in each country.
Thus we ﬁ  nd that the same allocation of resources and system of asset 
prices represents an equilibrium under either the assumption of costless 
cross-  border trade in ﬁ  nancial assets or the assumption of no trade at all.4 
Because these prices and quantities achieve asset-  price equalization with 
zero exchange of ﬁ  nancial assets, it follows that they would also represent 
an equilibrium under any assumption about costs of asset trade or incom-
pleteness of international ﬁ  nancial markets.5 Hence, in this model, increased 
ﬁ  nancial openness has no consequences whatsoever for asset- price determina-
tion or aggregate demand under any monetary policies. Of course this irrel-
4. This equivalence in a model with a unit elasticity of substitution between home and foreign 
goods was ﬁ  rst pointed out by Cole and Obstfeld (1991).
5. Here I assume that we start from an initial condition with zero net cross-  border ﬁ  nancial 
claims, as would necessarily be true in the case of ﬁ  nancial autarchy.20    Michael  Woodford
evance result is a fairly special one; in particular, it is not exactly true except 
in the case of preferences of the precise form (1.3); that is, a unit elasticity of 
substitution between domestic and foreign goods, and identical preferences 
in the two countries. But the fact that complete irrelevance is possible (and 
does not even require an “extreme” preference speciﬁ  cation) indicates that 
the eﬀects of ﬁ  nancial globalization need not be large.
It is also important to note that real interest-  rate equalization does not 
imply that domestic monetary policy has no eﬀect on domestic aggregate 
demand, even in the case of a country that is small relative to global markets 
(country H in the case in which   is near 1). Let us derive the “aggregate 
demand block” of our two-  country model (a generalization of the “AD 
curve” of a static, single-  country textbook model), by combining the equi-
librium relations between interest rates, real activity, and prices implied by 
intertemporal optimization and goods market clearing (corresponding to 
the “IS curve” of the textbook model) with those implied by the monetary 
policies of the two central banks (corresponding to the “LM curve”).
First, note that world demand for the composite world consumption 
good
(1.14)  Ct
w  (1    )Ct    Ct∗
must equal the supply of the composite world good, so that
(1.15)  Ct
w   kY t
1  Yt∗ ,
where Yt and Yt∗ are per capita aggregate production of the domestic and 
foreign composite goods, respectively. Next, note that (1.12) together with 
(1.7) implies that the consumption growth factor CT/  Ct (for any state at 
any date T   t) is the same for households in both countries. Hence, world 
demand for the composite world good must grow at that same rate as well, 
so that one must also have





   1
   Qt,T
P T  
P t





Substituting (1.15), we then have
(1.16)  Qt,T
P T  
P t




Pt∗    
Yt  
YT





  1 
.
Given these stochastic discount factors, the two nominal interest rates 
must satisfy
(1.17) (1    it) 1    Et
Y t  
Y t 1





  1  P t  
P t 1
and
(1.18) (1    it∗) 1    Et
Y t  
Y t 1
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Relations (1.17) and (1.18) are a pair of “IS equations” relating interest rates 
to output (real aggregate demand for each of the two countries’ products) 
and to expected inﬂ  ation, generalizing the “intertemporal IS relation”6 of a 
closed-  economy new Keynesian model.
To complete the “aggregate demand block” of the model, we must adjoin 
to these equations a pair of equations representing the monetary policies of 
the two central banks. For example, monetary policy might be speciﬁ  ed by 
a pair of “Taylor rules,”
(1.19) 1    it   I  t














where I  t and I t∗ are two state-  dependent factors that may represent time-
  variation in the inﬂ  ation target, a desire to respond to departures of output 
from a time- varying measure of potential, a time- varying conception of the 
“neutral” rate of interest, or a random control error in the implementation 
of the central bank’s interest-  rate target, among other possibilities. (For 
purposes of our analysis it matters only that the processes {I  t, I t∗} be exoge-
nously speciﬁ  ed, rather than depending on the evolution of any endogenous 
variables.) Then (1.17) through (1.20) represent a system of four equations 
per period to determine the evolution of the four nominal variables {P t, Pt∗, 
it, it∗}, given the evolution of the real quantities {Yt, Yt∗}. They thus repre-
sent a two-  country (and dynamic) version of the “AD equation” of a text-
book macro model. Together with a model of aggregate supply (discussed 
in section 1.3), they allow one to understand the endogenous determination 
of both output and inﬂ  ation in the two countries.
The question that we wish to address is, to what extent are the monetary 
policies of the two countries—here represented in particular by the evolu-
tion over time of the intercept terms I  t and I t∗—able to exert independent 
inﬂ  uence over aggregate demand (and hence the general level of prices) in 
each country? To examine the way in which the various endogenous vari-
ables are jointly determined, it is as usual convenient to log-  linearize the 
system of equilibrium relations around some steady-  state equilibrium val-
ues of the variables. The steady state that we shall consider is one in which 
there is a common steady-  state level of output in each country, Yt   Yt∗ 
  Y    0, and zero inﬂ  ation in each country; it follows that in each country 
the steady-  state nominal interest rate is equal to it   it∗    – 1 –   1   0. The 
monetary policy speciﬁ  cation is consistent with this if in the steady state, I  
   – 1Y 
–   y and I ∗    – 1Y 
–   ∗
y. The log-  linear approximations to the two “IS 
equations” (1.17) and (1.18) are given by
6. See, for example, equation (1.1) of Woodford (2003, chapter 4).22    Michael  Woodford
(1.21) (1     )Y ˆ
t    Y ˆ
t∗   Et[(1    )Y ˆ
t 1    Y ˆ∗
t 1]    (ı ˆt   Et t 1),
(1.22) (1     )Y ˆ
t    Y ˆ
t∗   Et[(1    )Y ˆ
t 1    Y ˆ∗
t 1]    (ı ˆt∗   Et ∗
t 1),
while the log- linear approximations to the two monetary policy rules (which 
here replace the “LM equations” that would be appropriate if, as in many 
textbook expositions, we were to specify monetary policy by a ﬁ  xed money 
supply7) are given by
(1.23)  ı ˆt   ı  t      t    yY ˆ
t,
(1.24)  ı ˆt∗   ı t∗    ∗
  t∗    ∗
yY ˆ
t∗.
Here I use the notation Y ˆ
t  log(Yt/Y ),  t  log(P t/  P t– 1), ı ˆt  log(1   it/ 1   ı ), 
ı  t  log(I  t/  I ), and correspondingly for the starred variables.
The system of equations (1.21) through (1.24) can be simpliﬁ  ed by using 
(1.23) and (1.24) to substitute for ı ˆt and ı ˆt∗ in the other two equations. Under 
the assumption that   ,  ∗




 t∗   A
Et t 1


















   ∗ 1,
and B0, B1 are two matrices of coeﬃcients, all of which are positive in the 
case that  y,  ∗
y   0. In the case that   ,  ∗
    1 (as recommended by Taylor 
[1999]), we observe that
lim
n→ 
 An   0,
and the system (1.25) can be “solved forward” to yield a unique bounded 
solution for the two inﬂ  ation rates in the case of any bounded processes {Y ˆ
t, 
Y ˆ
t∗, ı  t, ı t∗}, given by
(1.26)  
 t




t∗   
j=0
 









Etı  t j
Etı ∗
t j.
This generalizes the result obtained for a closed-  economy model in the case 
of a Taylor rule with      1.8
7. The addition of “LM equations” of this conventional sort to the model is discussed in 
section 1.2.
8. See, for example, equation (2.7) of Woodford (2003, chapter 2). The discussion there is of 
inﬂ  ation determination in a ﬂ  exible-  price model where {Y ˆ
t} is exogenously given, but the same 
calculation can be viewed as deriving a dynamic “AD relation” for a sticky-  price model.Globalization and Monetary Control    2 3
The solution obtained for home-  country inﬂ  ation can be written in the 
form




t j    2,jEtY ˆ∗
t j    3,jEtı t j    4,jEtı ∗
t j).
The coeﬃcients { i,j} for successive horizons j are plotted (for each of the 
values i   1, 2, 3, 4) in the four panels of ﬁ  gure 1.1. In these numerical illustra-
tions, I assume coeﬃcients      2,  y   1 for the Taylor rule in each country,9 
a value     6.37 for the intertemporal elasticity of substitution,10 and a period 
length of one quarter. The coeﬃcients of the solution are plotted for each 
9. In the notation of the chapter, where  t is a one-  period inﬂ  ation rate and ı ˆt a one-  period 
interest rate, then the values used are actually      2,  y   0.25. The values quoted in the text 
are the equivalent coeﬃcients of a Taylor rule written in terms of an annualized interest rate and 
an annualized inﬂ  ation rate, as in Taylor (1999), where a rule with these coeﬃcients is argued 
to be relatively similar to Fed policy under Alan Greenspan.
10. This is the value estimated for the U.S. economy by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). 
Here and elsewhere, the parameter values used in the numerical illustrations are such that 
in the case of a closed economy (the     0 case in ﬁ  gure 1.1), the model coincides with the 
baseline parameter values used in the numerical analysis of the basic new-  Keynesian model in 
Woodford (2003, chapter 4).
Fig. 1.1  Coeﬃcients of the dynamic AD relation (1.27), for alternative degrees of 
openness24    Michael  Woodford
of three possible values of  :     0, the closed economy limit;     0.5, the 
case of two countries of equal size; and     1, the small open economy limit.
The solution (1.26) can be viewed as describing a pair of dynamic “AD 
relations” for the two open economies, in each of which there is a downward- 
sloping static relation between the inﬂ  ation rate and output, or aggregate 
real expenditure on that country’s products. (The observation about the 
slope follows from the fact that the elements of B0 are positive. In the numeri-
cal examples, it is illustrated by the negative values for  1,0 shown in the upper 
left panel of ﬁ  gure 1.1.) Here we are especially interested in the question of 
how changes in each country’s monetary policy aﬀect the location of the 
AD curve in that country, and hence the inﬂ  ation rate that would result in 
the case of a given level of real activity.
Let us ﬁ  rst consider the eﬀect of the anticipated time path of the inter-
cept {ı  t} on inﬂ  ation in the home country, taking as given the magnitude 
of the response coeﬃcients   ,  y, and also leaving ﬁ  xed the speciﬁ  cation 
of monetary policy in the other country. These eﬀects are indicated by 
the coeﬃcients { 3,j} plotted in the lower left panel of ﬁ  gure 1.1. A ﬁ  rst 
important observation is that it is possible to shift the central-  bank reac-
tion function arbitrarily in one country, without violating any require-
ment for the existence of equilibrium—thus no market forces prevent a 
central bank from having an independent monetary policy, even in the case 
of complete ﬁ  nancial integration. (We see this from the fact that we have 
been able to solve the system [1.25] under an arbitrary perturbation of 
the path {ı  t}.)
Moreover, tightening policy in the home country (increasing ı  t, or being 
expected to increase it in a later period) shifts the AD relation for that coun-
try, so as to imply a lower inﬂ  ation rate  t for any expected paths of real 
activity in the two countries. (This is indicated by the negative coeﬃcients 
in the lower left panel of the ﬁ  gure.) Thus it continues to be possible to use 
monetary policy to control nominal expenditure and inﬂ  ation, even in a fully 
globalized economy. Indeed, the coeﬃcients indicating the eﬀect of current 
or expected future tightenings of policy on current inﬂ  ation are identical to 
those that would apply in the case of a closed economy, and are indepen-
dent of the size of the home economy relative to the world economy (i.e., 
are independent of the value of  ). Thus, even in the case of a very small 
open economy, monetary policy does not cease to be eﬀective for domestic 
inﬂ  ation control as a result of globalization.
The solution (1.26) can also be used to examine the degree to which there 
are monetary policy “spillovers” as a result of openness, at least to the extent 
that these are thought to operate through eﬀects of foreign monetary policy 
on aggregate demand. While the system solution (1.26) might make it appear 
that inﬂ  ation in each country depends on the monetary policies of both, 
this is not true (for given paths of output in the two countries). Because the 
matrix A is diagonal, the solution for  t is independent of the expected path Globalization and Monetary Control    2 5
of {ı ∗
t j}, and  t∗ is similarly independent of the expected path of {ı  t j}. (This 
is shown by the zero coeﬃcients at all horizons in the lower right panel of 
ﬁ  gure 1.1.) One can similarly show that the values of the coeﬃcients  ∗
 ,  ∗
y 
aﬀect only the solution for  t∗, and not the solution for  t.
The implication is that foreign monetary policy cannot aﬀect inﬂ  ation 
determination in the home country, except to the extent that this occurs 
through eﬀects of foreign monetary policy on foreign output. (In the case 
of completely ﬂ  exible wages and prices, so that monetary policy would have 
little eﬀect on real activity, there would be no possibility of “spillovers” from 
expansionary foreign monetary policy to domestic inﬂ  ation, assuming the 
home central bank follows a Taylor rule of the form [1.19].) And even the 
cross- border eﬀects that are possible when monetary policy aﬀects real activ-
ity are not necessarily of the kind often assumed in popular discussions of 
the implications of “excess global liquidity.” To the extent that expansionary 
monetary policy in the rest of the world makes foreign output temporar-
ily high, the equilibrium real rate of return consistent with a given path of 
output in the home country is lowered (as indicated by [1.21]). This makes a 
given Taylor rule for the home central bank more contractionary, as shown 
by the negative coeﬃcient  2,0 in the upper right panel of ﬁ  gure 1.1: if one 
is to avoid disinﬂ  ation and/  or reduced aggregate demand, it is necessary 
to lower ı  t in accordance with the reduction in the equilibrium real rate of 
return associated with trend output.11
It might seem surprising that an independent domestic monetary policy 
can exert the same eﬀect on domestic inﬂ  ation as in a closed economy, despite 
the fact that (at least in the case of a suﬃciently small open economy) there 
is no possibility of a nonnegligible aﬀect of domestic monetary policy on 
the common world real interest rate. But this should not really be a surprise. 
It is commonly understood in the case of closed economy monetary models 
that even in the case of fully ﬂ  exible wages and prices—so that neither output 
nor equilibrium real interest rates can be aﬀected by monetary policy—it 
remains possible for monetary policy to determine the general level of prices. 
This means that monetary policy can shift the AD relation even when it can-
not change the equilibrium real rate of interest.12 And the classic Mundell-
  Fleming analysis concludes that monetary policy should be more eﬀective, 
rather than less, in the case of international capital mobility, even though 
this is assumed to imply the existence of a common world interest rate; the 
fact that a monetary expansion cannot lower interest rates simply ensures 
11. These remarks apply to the case in which expansionary foreign monetary policy makes 
foreign output currently high relative to its expected future level. The anticipation of a for-
eign monetary expansion in the future would instead be currently inﬂ  ationary in the home 
country; for this would imply that foreign output should be higher in the future than it is 
now, making the equilibrium real rate of return higher rather than lower.
12. For an analysis of inﬂ  ation determination in such a model when monetary policy is speci-
ﬁ  ed by a Taylor rule, see Woodford (2003, chapter 2).26    Michael  Woodford
that all of the adjustment that results in a larger quantity of money being 
voluntarily held must involve increases in output or prices rather than lower 
interest rates. A similar conclusion obtains if the change in monetary policy 
is modeled as a shift in an interest- rate reaction function rather than a change 
in the money supply: both are simply reasons for the LM curve to shift.
1.1.2    Exchange-  Rate  Determination
One way to understand how monetary policy continues to be eﬀective even 
in the globalized economy is by considering the consequences of domestic 
monetary policy for the exchange rate, and the implications of exchange rate 
changes for inﬂ  ation. A log-  linear approximation to (1.11) implies that any 
equilibrium (in which departures from the steady state are suﬃciently small) 
must satisfy the uncovered interest rate parity condition,
(1.28)  ı ˆt   ı ˆt∗   Et(et 1   et),
where et  log εt. The implications of this relation for the equilibrium 
exchange rate are most easily derived in the case that we assume common 
reaction- function  coeﬃcients for the two central banks ( ∗
      ,  ∗
y    y), 
while allowing the intercepts ı t, ı t∗ to follow diﬀerent paths. In this case the 
monetary policy speciﬁ  cations (1.19) and (1.20) imply that
(1.29)  ı ˆt   ı ˆt∗   (ı t   ı t∗)     (zt   zt 1)    y(Y ˆ
t   Y ˆ
t∗),
introducing the notation zt  log(P t/  Pt∗) for the diﬀerential in the absolute 
level of prices between the two countries. Then using the fact that (1.10) 
implies that zt   et to substitute for zt in (1.29), and using this relation to 
substitute for the interest rate diﬀerential in (1.28), we obtain a diﬀerence 
equation of the form
(1.30)  Et et 1   (ı t   ı t∗)      et    y(Y ˆ
t   Y ˆ
t∗),
for the rate of exchange rate depreciation.
Under the assumption that      1, this has a unique bounded solution 
for the depreciation rate,
(1.31)   et   
j=0
 
∑   
 (j 1)[Et(ı ∗
t j   ı t j)    yEt(Y ˆ∗
t j   Y ˆ
t j)].
This shows how the exchange rate must depreciate as a result either of an 
increase in the relative tightness of foreign monetary policy or of an increase 
in relative foreign output. The law of one price implies that changes in the 
exchange rate must correspond directly to diﬀerences in the inﬂ  ation rates 
of the two countries, so that13
13. This solution is consistent, of course, with (1.26), derived earlier under more general 
assumptions; in fact, it is simply the diﬀerence between the ﬁ  rst and second lines of (1.26). 
The alternative derivation is intended simply to provide additional insight into the economic 
mechanisms reﬂ  ected by this solution.Globalization and Monetary Control    2 7
(1.32)   t    t∗    zt   
j=0
 
∑   
 (j 1)[Et(ı ∗
t j   ı t j)    yEt(Y ˆ∗
t j   Y ˆ
t j)].
Equation (1.32) shows how a change in the monetary policy of one cen-
tral bank, not perfectly matched by a corresponding change in the policy 
of the other central bank, must create a diﬀerence in the inﬂ  ation rates of 
the two countries. The result here only identiﬁ  es the equilibrium inﬂ  ation 
diﬀerential for a given output diﬀerential, but in the case that  y   0, the 
output diﬀerential is irrelevant, and the equation directly tells us what the 
inﬂ  ation diﬀerential must be. Moreover, the coeﬃcients in this relation do 
not involve  . It follows that even the central bank of a very small country 
must be able to substantially aﬀect domestic inﬂ  ation by changing its policy; 
for it can change the inﬂ  ation diﬀerential, and (at least in the case of a very 
small country) this must not be because it changes the inﬂ  ation rate in the 
rest of world but not at home.
The argument just given implies not only that the central bank must be 
able to shift the aggregate demand curve, but more speciﬁ  cally that it must 
be able to control the inﬂ  ation rate, regardless of the nature of aggregate 
supply (for example, no matter how sticky prices or wages may be). It is 
the ﬂ  exibility of the prices of imports in terms of the domestic currency 
in this model (implied by the assumption of producer-  currency pricing) 
that allows for such a strong conclusion. Indeed, Svensson (2000) argues 
that achievement of a central bank’s consumer price index (CPI) inﬂ  ation 
target is possible over a shorter horizon in the case that the economy is 
substantially open, under the assumption (as in the CGG model) that there 
is relatively immediate pass-  through of exchange-  rate changes to the prices 
of imported goods.14
1.1.3      Determination of the Domestic Price Index
In the previous discussion, I have assumed that the central bank is inter-
ested in controlling the evolution of a broad consumer price index, including 
the prices of imported consumer goods, and so have derived an “aggregate 
demand” relation that relates this price index to the volume of real activity 
in an open economy. This assumption is consistent with the kind of oﬃcial 
inﬂ  ation target that inﬂ  ation-  targeting central banks in small open econo-
mies typically aim at. However, one might also be interested in the ability of 
monetary policy to control the rate of growth of a domestic price index, in 
which one considers only the prices of goods produced in that country. This 
is certainly of analytical interest in isolating the various channels through 
which monetary policy can aﬀect inﬂ  ation, even if one’s stabilization objec-
tive is assumed to involve only CPI inﬂ  ation.15
14. Svensson calls this “the direct exchange-  rate channel” for the transmission of monetary 
policy.
15. See, for example, the discussion in Svensson (2000).28    Michael  Woodford
But it is also arguable that a central bank should concern itself with sta-
bilization of domestic prices rather than a consumer price index. Suppose, 
for example, that one takes the goal of monetary policy to be to eliminate 
the distortions resulting from nominal rigidities, by bringing about the allo-
cation of resources that would occur in the case of fully-  ﬂ  exible wages and 
prices. In a model of the kind considered by CGG (with ﬂ  exible wages and 
producer- currency pricing), this will be achieved if the monetary policies of 
the two central banks bring about an equilibrium in which the domestic price 
index is completely stabilized in each country. Import prices will instead vary 
in response to (asymmetric) shocks to real “fundamentals” in such an equi-
librium, since the relative prices of the goods produced in the two countries 
would vary in the case of ﬂ  exible wages and prices. Hence it might be deemed 
reasonable to hold each central bank responsible for stabilizing the domestic 
price index in its country, while allowing import prices to vary.
Here I consider the eﬀects of monetary policy on domestic inﬂ  ation in a 
globalized economy in order to clarify that the eﬀects on inﬂ  ation discussed 
in the previous section do not result purely from what Svensson calls the 
“direct exchange- rate channel.” I show that one can also derive an aggregate-
  demand equation that relates the domestic price index to domestic output, 
and indeed it might seem more reasonable to call this “the aggregate demand 
curve,” since it is the product of these two quantities that represents aggre-
gate expenditure on domestic products.
Under the preferences previously assumed, consumer optimization 
implies a simple connection between the equilibrium terms of trade and 
the composition of world output. The law of one price implies that the 
relative price of home and foreign goods is the same in both countries, and 
consequently (1.4) and (1.5) imply that households choose the same ratio 
of foreign goods to home goods in both countries. Market- clearing requires 
that this common ratio equal the relative supplies of the two types of goods; 
hence the equilibrium terms of trade must satisfy16
(1.33)  St  
P Ft  
P Ht
   
Yt  
Yt∗.
The deﬁ  nition of the consumption price index P t then implies that
(1.34) 
P Ht  
P t
   kSt
     kYt
  Yt∗ ,
(1.35) 
P Ft  
P t
   kSt
1     kYt
1  Yt∗  1.
We now have a solution for equilibrium relative prices, given output in the 
two countries. Combining this with our previous solution for consumer price 
16. Note that Yt is output per capita in the home country, and similarly with Yt∗; hence the 
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inﬂ  ation given output, we can obtain a solution for domestic price inﬂ  ation 
in each country, given the two countries’ levels of output. If we deﬁ  ne the 
domestic inﬂ  ation rates in each country as  Ht    log P Ht,  ∗
Ft    log P∗
Ft,17 
then relations (1.34) and (1.35) imply that
(1.36)   Ht    t    ( Y ˆ
t∗    Y ˆ
t),
(1.37)   ∗
Ft    t∗   (1    )( Y ˆ
t    Y ˆ
t∗).
If we then substitute the previous solution (1.26) for the consumer price 
inﬂ  ation rates in these expressions, we obtain solutions for  Ht and  ∗
Ft as 
functions of the paths of output in the two countries and the two monetary 
policies, under the assumption that monetary policy is described by two rules 
of the form (1.19) and (1.20). Our conclusions about the magnitude of the 
eﬀect on home country inﬂ  ation of a change in home country monetary 
policy remain exactly the same as before, since (as long as we are controlling 
for the paths of output in the two countries) there is no additional eﬀect on 
the terms of trade.
If, however, the central bank is concerned with stabilization of domestic 
inﬂ  ation rather than consumer price inﬂ  ation, it may be of more interest to 
consider the consequences of monetary policy rules that respond to domes-
tic inﬂ  ation rather than to CPI inﬂ  ation as assumed in (1.19) and (1.20). 
Suppose, then, that we replace (1.19) by a policy of the form
(1.38) 1    it   I  t





and similarly for the foreign central bank. In this case, we can no longer 
simply use the solution (1.26) for the CPI inﬂ  ation rates, but must instead 
repeat the derivation using the alternative monetary policy rules.
Rewriting (1.21) and (1.22) in terms of domestic inﬂ  ation rates, by using 
(1.36) and (1.37) to substitute for the CPI inﬂ  ation rates, we obtain
(1.39) (1     )Y ˆ
t    Y ˆ
t∗   Et[(1    )Y ˆ
t 1    Y ˆ∗
t 1]    (ı ˆt   Et Ht 1),
(1.40) (1     ∗)Y ˆ
t∗    ∗Y ˆ
t   Et[(1    ∗)Y ˆ∗
t 1    ∗Y ˆ
t 1]    (ı ˆt∗   Et ∗
Ft 1),
where
    (    1),   ∗  (1    )(    1).
Combining these with the log-  linearized central-  bank reaction functions,
(1.41)  ı ˆt   ı t      Ht    yY ˆ
t,
(1.42)  ı ˆt∗   ı t∗    ∗
  ∗
Ft    ∗
yY ˆ
t∗,
17. Clarida, Galí, and Gertler simply call the domestic inﬂ  ation rates  t and  t∗, respectively; 
thus their notation encourages an emphasis on domestic inﬂ  ation stabilization.30    Michael  Woodford
we then have a system of four equations per period to solve for the paths of 
{ Ht,  ∗
Ft, ı ˆt, ı ˆt∗}, given the paths of {Y ˆ
t, Y ˆ
t∗, ı t, ı t∗}. Once one has a solution to 
these equations, the evolution of the CPI inﬂ  ation rates in the two countries 
is then given by equations (1.36) and (1.37).
The system of equations (1.39) through (1.42) can again be reduced to a 
pair of equations for the two domestic inﬂ  ation rates, and this system can 




Ft   A
Et Ht 1
Et ∗










t 1   A
ı  t
ı t∗,
where the matrix A is the same as in (1.25), but the matrices B ˜
0, B ˜
1 are 
diﬀerent. Again the system has a unique bounded solution in the case that 
  ,  ∗
    1, and again it is of the form (1.26), making the appropriate sub-
stitutions. Because the diagonal elements of B ˜
0 are again necessarily positive, 
this solution again deﬁ  nes a downward- sloping AD curve for each country; 
but now each AD curve relates the price index for that country’s products 
to a corresponding index of the quantity sold of those products. The AD 
relation for the home country can again be written in the form (1.27), except 
that this is now an equation for domestic inﬂ  ation rather than CPI inﬂ  ation; 
the numerical values of the coeﬃcients (under the same parameter values as 
before) are now shown in ﬁ  gure 1.2.18
We again ﬁ  nd that there is scope for independent variation in the monetary 
policies of the two central banks, and that either central bank can shift the 
AD curve for its country (and hence the domestic inﬂ  ation rate associated 
with given paths of real activity in the two countries) by varying its policy. 
In fact, because the matrix A is the same as in the previous section, we ﬁ  nd 
exactly the same coeﬃcients as before for the quantitative eﬀects of current 
or expected future changes in ı  t j on the domestic rate of inﬂ  ation. And once 
again, we ﬁ  nd that any spillovers from foreign monetary policy on aggregate 
demand in the home country must be due to the eﬀects of foreign monetary 
policy on foreign output. However, the sign and likely magnitude of any 
spillovers are now more ambiguous, as negative terms have been added to 
the oﬀ-  diagonal elements of B ˜
0 and B ˜
1 that tend to reduce the size of these 
elements, and can even reverse their sign.19
When we expressed the AD curve as a relation between P t and Yt, the 
eﬀect of higher foreign output was clearly contractionary, because higher 
equilibrium consumption of foreign output by domestic households implies 
a lower marginal utility of income for any given level of domestic output 
18. Note that while I again assume that      2, the coeﬃcient has a diﬀerent meaning, as it 
now indicates the response to variations in domestic inﬂ  ation only.
19. For the parameter values used in the numerical example shown in ﬁ  gure 1.2, the sign of 
the eﬀect of foreign monetary stimulus on home inﬂ  ation is reversed, as shown in the upper 
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(and hence domestic consumption of domestic output), just as if there had 
been a reduction in domestic households’ impatience to consume. But now 
we must also take into account the fact that higher foreign output implies 
an improvement of the home country’s terms of trade (for any given level of 
home output), and hence a higher value of P Ht relative to P t; this additional 
eﬀect tends to shift the AD curve in terms of P Ht and Yt outward, oﬀsetting 
the other eﬀect. In fact, if     1 (the case of log utility of consumption), 
the two eﬀects exactly cancel, and both B ˜
0 and B ˜
1 are diagonal matrices. In 
this case, the solution (1.26) implies that the location of the home-  country 
AD curve depends only on home monetary policy and the expected future 
path of home output (and likewise for the foreign-  country AD curve); thus 
there are no international monetary policy spillovers in the AD block of 
the model.20
This last result is a fairly special one. In fact, it is not obvious that     1 
Fig. 1.2  Coeﬃcients of the dynamic AD relation in terms of domestic inﬂ  ation, for 
alternative degrees of openness
20. This result is obtained by CGG, who express the model structural relations entirely in 
terms of domestic inﬂ  ation. They ﬁ  nd a similar decoupling of the structural equations for the 
two countries in the aggregate-  supply block of the model in the case that     1, as discussed 
in section 1.3.32    Michael  Woodford
should be regarded as a realistic calibration of the model. While the assump-
tion of log utility of consumption is fairly common in real business-  cycle 
models, it is important to note that this is a speciﬁ  cation of the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution of nondurable consumer expenditure only, in 
a model in which investment spending is separately modeled (and speciﬁ  ed 
to be much more substitutable over time). In a model in which all private 
expenditure is modeled as if it were consumer expenditure (i.e., we abstract 
from any eﬀects of private spending on the evolution of productive capac-
ity), more realistic conclusions are obtained if we specify preferences over 
the time path of such “consumption” with an intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution well above one.21 In this case, the terms- of- trade eﬀect of higher 
foreign output is quantitatively more important than the implied reduction 
of the marginal utility of income (which is proportional to  – 1), so there 
will be a nonzero net eﬀect on home aggregate demand that is expansion-
ary. (This is illustrated in the upper right panel of ﬁ  gure 1.2.) Nonetheless, 
the fact that the two eﬀects have opposite signs means that we may have less 
reason to expect such spillovers to be quantitatively signiﬁ  cant if we are con-
cerned with an AD relation speciﬁ  ed in terms of the domestic price index.
It should also be recalled that even if     1, while it is then possible to 
choose a Taylor rule that should completely stabilize domestic inﬂ  ation with-
out requiring any response to foreign variables, this does not mean that one 
can stabilize CPI inﬂ  ation without responding to foreign variables. Thus, the 
“decoupling” of the aggregate demand curves that occurs in this case would 
not really imply that a central bank has no need to monitor foreign develop-
ments, except under a particular view of its stabilization objectives.
We can also derive an AD relation between the consumer price index and 
domestic output, as in section 1.1.1, even if we assume that monetary policy 
responds to domestic inﬂ  ation only. Equation (1.36) together with our solu-
tion of the form (1.27) for  Ht allow us to derive a relation of the form




t j    2,jEtY ˆ∗
t j    3,jEtı t j    4,jEtı ∗
t j)     log St 1
for CPI inﬂ  ation. (Here the lagged terms of trade matter for CPI inﬂ  ation 
determination, contrary to what we previously found in equation [1.27], 
because we now assume that the domestic policy rule involves the lagged 
domestic price index, whereas the CPI inﬂ  ation rate is deﬁ  ned relative to the 
lagged consumer price index.) The coeﬃcient  2,0 is more negative than in 
the case of the solution for domestic inﬂ  ation, by an amount that is greater 
the more open is the economy, owing to the eﬀect of higher foreign output 
on the terms of trade. Figure 1.3 plots the coeﬃcients for the same numerical 
examples as in ﬁ  gure 1.2; one observes that the sign of the coeﬃcient  2,0 is 
21. See Woodford (2003, 242– 43, 362– 63) for further discussion of the proper interpretation 
of this parameter in a basic new-  Keynesian model of the monetary transmission mechanism.Globalization and Monetary Control    3 3
reversed. Thus one ﬁ  nds, once again, that (for these parameter values) stimu-
lative foreign monetary policy will have a contractionary eﬀect on aggregate 
demand in the home country; indeed, the eﬀect is even stronger than in the 
model of section 1.1.1.
1.1.4      Consequences of Local-  Currency Pricing
The argument previously given for the ability of domestic monetary pol-
icy to control the domestic inﬂ  ation rate depends, as explained at the end 
of section 1.1.1, on a supposition that exchange rate changes automatically 
imply changes in the prices charged for the same goods in the two diﬀerent 
countries. But it is often observed that exchange rate changes are not imme-
diately “passed through” to import prices in this way. If imported goods 
instead have sticky prices in terms of the currency of the country where they 
are sold—so that the law of one price need not hold, in the short run—does 
the argument given for the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy in controlling 
domestic inﬂ  ation still hold?
To examine this question, I present a variant of the model of “local-
  currency pricing” proposed by Betts and Devereux (2000), in which, how-
Fig. 1.3  Coeﬃcients of the dynamic AD relation in terms of CPI inﬂ  ation, when 
the policy rule is (1.38)34    Michael  Woodford
ever, price changes are staggered after the fashion proposed by Calvo (just as 
in CGG).22 I shall assume the same preferences as in CGG (and the previous 
section), so that once again households in the two countries consume the 
same goods and have identical preferences.
Certain equilibrium conditions of the CGG model that did not depend 
on the law of one price continue to hold in the model with local-  currency 
pricing. Intertemporal optimization by households continues to imply that 
(1.8) must hold, and likewise the corresponding equation for the starred 
variables. Log-  linearizing these equilibrium relations, we obtain
C ˆ
t   EtC ˆ
t 1    (ı ˆt   Et t 1),
and a corresponding equation for the starred variables. Taking a weighted 
average of this equation (multiplied by 1 –    ) and the corresponding equa-
tion for the starred variables (multiplied by  ), we obtain the additional 
implication that
(1.44)  C ˆ
t
w   EtC ˆ w
t 1    (ı ˆt
w   Et w
t 1),
using the notation C ˆ
t
w  log(Ct
w/  kY )   (1 –   )C ˆ
t    C ˆ
t∗, ı ˆt
w  (1 –   )ı ˆt    ı ˆt∗, 
and  t
w  (1 –   ) t     t∗. Moreover, clearing of the goods markets requires 
(to a ﬁ  rst-  order approximation23) that
C ˆ
t





w  (1 –    )Y ˆ
t    Y ˆ
t∗. Using this to substitute for C ˆ
t
w in (1.44), we 
obtain
(1.45)  Y ˆ
t
w   EtY ˆ w
t 1    (ı ˆt
w   Et w
t 1).
Note that (1.45) is just a weighted average of the two conditions (1.21) 
and (1.22) derived for the model with producer-  currency pricing (PCP). In 
fact, all of the implications of the system (1.21) and (1.22) are contained in 
the pair of conditions consisting of (1.45) and the condition
(1.46)  ı ˆt   ı ˆt∗   Et t 1   Et ∗
t 1,
obtained by subtracting (1.22) from (1.21). In order to complete our analysis 
of the aggregate demand block of the model, we must ﬁ  nd the relation cor-
responding to (1.46) for the model with local-  currency pricing (LCP).
Another condition derived earlier that continues to hold in the LCP model 
is (1.11), and again this implies the uncovered interest-  parity relation (1.28) 
when log- linearized. In the model with producer- currency pricing, the result 
that zt   et together with (1.28) implies the condition (1.46). With local-
22. The model is essentially a simpliﬁ  ed version of the one presented in Benigno (2004).
23. Aggregate supply of the composite world good need not equal aggregate demand for 
it, if the composition of the consumption bundles of households in the two countries are not 
identical. But even in that case, the discrepancy is of second order in the amplitude of depar-
tures from the steady-  state allocation.Globalization and Monetary Control    3 5
  currency pricing, instead, (1.28) still holds, but zt need not equal et, so that 
this derivation is no longer possible.
The relation between the relative absolute price levels in the two coun-
tries and the exchange rate will instead depend on what we assume about 
price adjustment. With local- currency pricing, there are four diﬀerent price-
  setting problems to consider: for each of the two types of goods (goods 
produced in the home country and goods produced in the foreign country), 
prices are set in terms of both the home currency and the foreign currency. 
Each supplier chooses two prices, and the decisions are independent, in the 
sense that the price charged in one currency does not constrain the price 
that can be charged in the other.24 The two prices for any given good are the 
prices charged to buyers in the two diﬀerent countries; there is assumed to 
be no opportunity for cross-  border arbitrage by households. Producers can 
instead sell the same goods in either country, so that a common marginal 
cost of supplying additional goods is relevant to their pricing decision in 
each country. Here I furthermore assume Calvo- style staggered price setting 
(as in the model of CGG), and more speciﬁ  cally that there is a common 
fraction 0       1 of prices of each of the four types that remain ﬁ  xed from 
one period to the next.25
Under this form of price setting (discussed further in section 1.3), the 
index of home goods prices in units of the home currency (which are the 
prices charged for these goods in the home country) evolves in accordance 
with a relation of the form
(1.47)   Ht   ξ(    log MCt   log P Ht)    Et Ht 1,
where MCt is the nominal marginal cost (in units of the home currency) of 
supplying additional home goods (a geometric average across the diﬀerent 
producers of home goods),     0 is the log of the desired markup of price 
over marginal cost (reﬂ  ecting the market power of the monopolistically 
competitive suppliers), and ξ   0 is a coeﬃcient (deﬁ  ned in section 1.3) that 
is smaller the less frequently prices are reconsidered. The producers of home 
goods face a similar problem in choosing the prices that they charge for their 
goods in the foreign country, and in this case the marginal cost of supplying 
additional home goods in units of the foreign currency is MCt/  εt. As a result, 
the evolution of  ∗
Ht satisﬁ  es a corresponding equilibrium relation
(1.48)   ∗
Ht   ξ(    log MCt   et   log P∗
Ht)    Et ∗
Ht 1.
One then observes that subtraction of (1.48) from (1.47) implies that
24. Similar conclusions would obtain if we were to assume that the producers sell to separate 
retailers in the two countries, each of which sets the retail price in its market. What is crucial 
is the assumption that each retailer has a monopoly over sales of the good in a particular 
country.
25. It does not matter whether we assume that a given ﬁ  rm reconsiders its prices in both 
countries at the same time, or at random dates that arrive independently in the two cases.36    Michael  Woodford
(1.49)   zHt   ξ(et   zHt)    Et zHt 1,
where zHt  log(P Ht/  P∗
Ht) is the diﬀerential price of home goods in the two 
countries. This can alternatively be written as
Et[A(L)zHt 1]   ξet   0,
where
(1.50)  A(L)      (1       ξ)L   L2.
We can alternatively write
A(L)    (1    1L)(1    2L)     1
 1(1    1L)(1     1L 1)L,
where 0    1   1    2 are the two roots of the characteristic equation
 2A(  1)   0.
It follows that given a diﬀerence- stationary process for {et}, there is a unique 
diﬀerence-  stationary process for {zHt} consistent with (1.49), given by
(1.51)  zHt    1zHt 1   (1    1)(1     1)
j=0
 
∑(  1) jEtet j.
Similar calculations are possible in the case of the prices set by the pro-
ducers of foreign goods in the two countries, as a result of which one con-
cludes that the diﬀerential price of foreign goods in the two countries, zFt  
log(P Ft/  P∗
Ft), satisﬁ  es exactly the same diﬀerence equation (1.49). (While the 
marginal cost of producing foreign goods need not be the same as that of 
producing home goods, what matters for this calculation is that the ratio of 
the marginal costs of supplying goods in the two countries is in each case 
given by the exchange rate.) Hence, zFt must also be given by (1.51). It follows 
that zFt   zHt   zt at all times. The overall price diﬀerential between the two 
countries, zt, therefore satisﬁ  es a diﬀerence equation of the form
(1.52)   zt   ξ(et   zt)    Et zt 1,
the solution to which is given by
(1.53)  zt    1zt 1   (1    1)(1     1)
j=0
 
∑(  1) jEtet j.
Equation (1.53) indicates that the path of zt (and hence of the inﬂ  ation 
diﬀerential between the two countries) is completely determined by the path 
of the exchange rate, just as in the PCP model; this solution replaces the 
simpler relation zt   et that held under the earlier assumption. Note that 
(1.53) implies that zt is a two-  sided moving average of past and expected 
future values of the log exchange rate. The moving average smooths the 
exchange rate over a longer time window the closer  1 is to 1, or alterna-
tively, the smaller is ξ (which is to say, the larger is  ). In the limit as   → 0, Globalization and Monetary Control    3 7
so that prices are completely ﬂ  exible, the solution (1.53) reduces simply to 
zt   et.
The complete aggregate- demand block26 of the model with local- currency 
pricing then consists of equations (1.19) and (1.20) specifying the monetary 
policies of the two central banks, and equations (1.28), (1.45), and (1.52) 
that result from private optimization. Among these equilibrium conditions, 
all except the last also apply to the model with producer-  currency pricing. 
The PCP model replaces (1.52) with the relation zt   et, which is just the 
limiting case of (1.52) when   → 0. Hence the aggregate-  demand relations 
of the PCP model correspond to the case     0 of the aggregate-  demand 
relations of the LCP model; under the PCP assumption, however, unlike the 
LCP model, the aggregate-  demand relations are the same regardless of the 
degree of stickiness of prices.
A pair of aggregate-  demand relations parallel to (1.26) in the case of the 
PCP can also be derived here. As long as the response coeﬃcients of the policy 
rules satisfy certain inequalities,27 it is possible to uniquely solve the system of 
equations consisting of (1.19) and (1.20), (1.28), (1.45), and (1.52) for bounded 
processes { t,  t∗, ı ˆt, ı ˆt∗, et –   zt}, given any bounded processes {Y ˆ
t, Y ˆ
t∗, ı t, ı t∗}. 
(And once again the solution is purely forward- looking, in the sense that each 
of the ﬁ  ve endogenous variables depends only on current and expected future 
values of the four forcing variables.) Again we ﬁ  nd that existence of equilib-
rium places no (local) restrictions on the way in which monetary policy may be 
independently varied in the two countries, and again we ﬁ  nd that adjustment 
of monetary policy in one country alone can alter the path of inﬂ  ation in that 
country (for any given paths of real activity in the two countries).
The eﬀects of monetary policy on inﬂ  ation (or on the location of the AD 
curve) can be stated more explicitly in the special case in which       ∗
  and 
 y    ∗
y. In this case, (1.19) and (1.20) again imply (1.29), and this can again 
be used to substitute for the interest-  rate diﬀerential in (1.28), yielding
(1.54)  Et et 1   (ı t   ı t∗)      zt    y(Y ˆ
t   Y ˆ
t∗).
However, we can no longer use the requirement that zt   et to transform 
(1.54) into (1.30). Instead we must solve the system consisting of (1.52) and 
(1.54) for the paths of et and zt.
26. It might not seem right to call equation (1.52) part of the “aggregate-  demand block” 
of the model, as it depends on one’s model of price-  setting behavior, and on the value of the 
parameter  . However, it is independent of the evolution of marginal cost, and so can be derived 
without discussing the speciﬁ  cation of the production technology, preferences regarding labor 
supply, or the degree of integration of factor markets. It is also clear that (1.52) plays the same 
role in the LCP model as the requirement that zt   et in the PCP model, and we did use that 
relation in deriving the AD equations for the earlier model, despite the fact that it follows from 
an assumption about the pricing of goods. Finally, we do clearly require (1.52) in order to be 
able to derive the AD relations for the LCP model.
27. As in section 1.1.1, these involve only the inﬂ  ation-  response coeﬃcient   ,  ∗
 , and once 
again it is necessary for a unique solution that   ,  ∗
    1.38    Michael  Woodford
This pair of equations can be written in the form

 zt
et   zt   A
Et zt 1
Et(et 1   zt 1)   a[ı t∗   ı t    y(Y ˆ
t∗   Y ˆ
t)],
where





    
and a is the second column of A. One can show that A has both eigenvalues 
inside the unit circle if and only if      1; under this assumption, there is a 
unique bounded solution given by
(1.55)  
 zt




t j   ı t j    y(Y ˆ∗
t j   Y ˆ
t j)].
The ﬁ  rst line of (1.55) generalizes our previous solution (1.32) for the inﬂ  a-
tion diﬀerential;28 while it is algebraically more complex, we again obtain 
a solution for the inﬂ  ation diﬀerential as a function of the expected future 
paths of exactly the same variables as before. Once again, we ﬁ  nd that a 
change in monetary policy in one country that is not matched by an equiva-
lent change in the other country’s policy necessarily changes the inﬂ  ation 
diﬀerential between the two countries, for any given paths of output in the 
two countries. Moreover, in the case that  y   0, one can determine the 
eﬀect on the inﬂ  ation diﬀerential independently of what one may assume 
about aggregate supply. It is also noteworthy that while the size of the eﬀect 
of a change in monetary policy on the inﬂ  ation diﬀerential depends on the 
degree of inﬂ  ation sensitivity (  ) of the central banks’ reaction functions 
and the degree of price ﬂ  exibility (ξ), it does not depend on the relative size 
of the countries (i.e., on  ).
We can complete the derivation of the AD relations for the two coun-
tries in this symmetric case, by using (1.19) and (1.20) to substitute for the 
interest rates in (1.45), yielding a diﬀerence equation for the world average 
inﬂ  ation rate,
(1.56)   t
w     
 1[Et w
t 1     1EtY ˆ w
t 1   (  1    y)Y ˆ
t
w   ı t
w].
This relation can then be “solved forward” to yield29
(1.57)     t
w      






∑   
 (j 1)Et{[  1     
 1(  1    y)]Y ˆw
t j 1   ı 
w
t j}
28. Note that the ﬁ  rst line of (1.55) reduces precisely to (1.32) in the limit as ξ →  .
29. The necessary and suﬃcient condition for a unique bounded solution is again that      1. 
Under this assumption, the inﬁ  nite sum is well-  deﬁ  ned and bounded in the case of bounded 
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Since both  t and  t∗ can be expressed as linear combinations of the world 
average inﬂ  ation rate  t
w and the inﬂ  ation diﬀerential  zt, the pair of equa-
tions (1.55) and (1.57) completely characterize the AD relations for the two 
countries.
The AD relation for the home country can again be written in the form 
(1.27), just as in the case of the PCP model. Figure 1.4 illustrates the 
numerical coeﬃcients in the case of the same parameter values as before, 
and assuming in addition that ξ   0.04.30 Again the coeﬃcients are shown 
for three diﬀerent possible values of  . When     0 (the closed-  economy 
limit), the LCP model is indistinguishable from the PCP model (as there 
are no import prices), but for     0 the two models are no longer equiv-
alent.
Note that in the limiting case of a very small country (the home country in 
the case that   → 1), domestic monetary policy is no longer able to have any 
inﬂ  uence on the predicted path of  t
w given the expected evolution of world 
Fig. 1.4  Coeﬃcients of the dynamic AD relation (1.27) for the model with local- 
currency pricing
30. This value as well corresponds to the magnitude of this coeﬃcient in the empirical model 
of Rotemberg and Woodford (1997); see also Woodford (2003, chapter 5).40    Michael  Woodford
output. (Indeed, in this limiting case,  t
w depends only on foreign output and 
foreign monetary policy.) But even so, (1.55) implies that the sensitivity of 
the inﬂ  ation diﬀerential to domestic monetary policy is exactly as great as 
it would be for a larger country. Hence domestic inﬂ  ation is still aﬀected by 
domestic monetary policy, and to a nontrivial extent, as is illustrated by the 
coeﬃcients in the upper left panel of ﬁ  gure 1.4.
It is true that in the LCP model, the slow (and smoothed) pass-  through 
of exchange rate changes to import prices reduces the size of the immediate 
eﬀect on domestic inﬂ  ation of a transitory change in domestic monetary 
policy, relative to what occurs in the PCP model. However, this does not 
mean that it is harder for monetary policy to aﬀect inﬂ  ation than would be 
the case in a closed economy in which prices are sticky for a similar length 
of time. While the coeﬃcient  1,0 becomes quite small in the small open 
economy case, the coeﬃcients  1, j, indicating the eﬀects of anticipated future 
domestic monetary policy on current inﬂ  ation, no longer die out quickly 
as the horizon j increases. This means that a persistent shift in the central 
bank’s policy reaction function can have a substantial immediate eﬀect. The 
crucial diﬀerence is that in this model it becomes more important for interest 
rates to be adjusted in a relatively inertial way in order to have a substantial 
impact on aggregate demand.
In fact, a suﬃciently persistent shift in policy (that is understood by the 
private sector) still aﬀects inﬂ  ation to the same extent as in the LCP model. 
For example, it follows from (1.55) that a permanent unit increase in the 
intercept ı t (corresponding to a reduction in the implicit domestic inﬂ  ation 
target of size [   –   1]– 1) lowers the inﬂ  ation diﬀerential immediately and 
permanently by the amount of the reduction in the implicit inﬂ  ation target, 
which is the same prediction as is implied by (1.32). In the case that the home 
country is very small, this is also the size of the immediate, permanent reduc-
tion in domestic inﬂ  ation; thus the same size eﬀect on inﬂ  ation is predicted 
as in the case of a closed economy.
In the example shown in ﬁ  gure 1.4, prices are relatively sticky,31 as shown 
by the small value of ξ. This makes the equilibrium dynamics under the 
LCP model quite diﬀerent from those of the PCP model. In ﬁ  gure 1.5, the 
coeﬃcients of the dynamic AD relation are instead computed under the as-
sumption that ξ   0.4, implying a short-  run aggregate-  supply curve that is 
ten times as steep. In this case, the diﬀerence with ﬁ  gure 1.1 is less dramatic. 
As the value of ξ is increased still further, the coeﬃcients for each of the 
values of   all approach those shown in ﬁ  gure 1.1.
31. By this I mean that the rate of adjustment of price indices to changing aggregate condi-
tions is relatively slow. This is not due solely to the value assumed for  , but also to the fact that 
the parameter values used by Rotemberg and Woodford imply substantial “real rigidities.” See 
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1.2      “Global Liquidity” and the Instruments of Monetary Policy
Another way in which globalization is sometimes supposed to reduce 
the signiﬁ  cance of individual national monetary policies is by making the 
aggregate supply of “liquidity” by the world’s central banks (rather than that 
supplied by a given country’s central bank alone) the variable that deter-
mines the degree of stimulus to aggregate demand (and hence inﬂ  ationary 
pressure) in that country as well as abroad. Market analysts in ﬁ  nancial insti-
tutions have spoken a great deal recently of “global liquidity” as a factor that 
has supposedly been responsible for asset-  price booms worldwide, and it is 
often proposed that this factor can be measured by growth in some aggregate 
of the money supplies in diﬀerent currencies (e.g., Global Research, 2007), 
following the lead of European Central Bank (ECB) researchers such as 
Sousa and Zaghini (2004, 2006) and Rüﬀer and Stracca (2006). To the extent 
that such a view is correct in a globally integrated world economy, one might 
Fig. 1.5  Coeﬃcients of the dynamic AD relation for the LCP model with   0.442    Michael  Woodford
expect that it should mean a reduced ability of national central banks to 
control national inﬂ  ation rates, especially in the case of small countries that 
supply a correspondingly small proportion of “global liquidity.”
As noted in the previous section, in an open economy there are channels 
through which foreign monetary policy developments (among other foreign 
factors) will generally aﬀect the level of domestic aggregate demand, for any 
given stance of domestic monetary policy. It may even be the case, though 
it need not be, that the eﬀect of domestic interest-  rate policy on domestic 
aggregate demand is smaller in the case of a small open economy than it 
would be for a large economy (or a closed economy). But as explained in the 
previous section, even in the case of full integration and the limiting case 
of a very small economy, the eﬀect of domestic monetary policy on domes-
tic demand does not become negligible, and thus the idea that only some 
global aggregate of liquidity creation by central banks is relevant is clearly 
mistaken. Moreover, monetary stimulus abroad may contract demand for 
domestic output, owing to the terms-  of-  trade eﬀect of the depreciation of 
the foreign currency; in such a case, while foreign monetary policy is relevant 
to domestic conditions, the sign of the eﬀect is the opposite of the one sug-
gested by loose talk about “global liquidity.”
The analysis in the previous section, however, took for granted the exis-
tence of an instrument through which a central bank can control the level 
of short-  term nominal interest rates in terms of its currency, as long as the 
possibility exists of a savings-  investment equilibrium at a diﬀerent level of 
interest rates; thus it was assumed that policy can be represented by a Taylor 
rule, without asking how a central bank is able to implement its operating 
target for the nominal interest rate. It is often supposed that central-  bank 
control over nominal interest rates depends on the central bank’s role as a 
monopoly supplier of ﬁ  nancial claims (“base money”) that are uniquely 
liquid. Might integration of ﬁ  nancial markets erode this monopoly power, 
so that the liquidity premium associated with base money in any country 
comes to depend on the global supply of liquid assets, rather than the supply 
by that country’s central bank alone? And if so, would this mean that cen-
tral banks (at least, small central banks) would lose the capacity to control 
nominal interest rates within their borders?
In order to consider this possibility, I ﬁ  rst discuss the instruments through 
which a central bank’s operating target for a domestic short-  term nominal 
interest rate can be implemented in an open economy, relying upon a conven-
tional model of money demand, in which it is assumed that only the liabili-
ties of a given country’s central bank are useful for facilitating transactions 
(and so supply liquidity services) in that country. I then consider the extent 
to which the conclusions would be changed if globalization were to imply 
that the liquidity services provided by the liabilities of a given central bank 
were available equally to households in all countries.Globalization and Monetary Control    4 3
1.2.1      Money Demand and Monetary Policy Implementation 
in a Two-Country Model
We can introduce liquidity services from holdings of base money by sup-
posing that the utility of households in the home economy is of the form
(2.1)  E0 
t=0
 
∑  tu(Ct)   w
Mt  
P t,
where u(C) is again deﬁ  ned by (1.2) and (1.3), Mt indicates home-  currency 
money balances, and




1    m
 1
for some  m   0. Because of the additive separability of the utility function 
between consumption and liquidity services, the conclusions of section 1.1 
are not changed by the addition of the new term; this will only aﬀect the 
demand for money balances (not treated earlier).
Base money is assumed to be a one-  period liability of the central bank 
that promises a riskless nominal return (in units of the domestic currency) 
of it
m between periods t and t   1; the rate it
m is an administered rate (rather 
than market-  determined), and the choice of it is an additional potential 
instrument of policy for the central bank. (Under some regimes, like that 
of the United States at present, it
m   0 at all times; but this is a choice rather 
than a logical necessity.32) The ﬂ  ow budget constraint of a household is then 
of the form33
P tCt   Mt   Et[Qt,t 1At 1]   (1   i m
t 1)Mt 1   At   P tYt   Tt,
where At denotes the state-  contingent nominal value (in units of the home 
currency) of the household’s portfolio of nonmonetary ﬁ  nancial claims car-
ried into period t and Tt represents net nominal tax collections by the home 
government. Here it is assumed that (in order for there to exist no arbitrage 
opportunities) all nonmonetary ﬁ  nancial assets are priced using the common 
stochastic discount factor Qt,t 1 (so that any portfolio with state- contingent 
payoﬀ At 1 in period t   1 must cost Et[Qt,t 1At 1] in period t), while money is 
not because of its additional service ﬂ  ow. Under the assumption of complete 
ﬁ  nancial markets, we need not describe any speciﬁ  c nonmonetary ﬁ  nancial 
32. See Woodford (2001) and Woodford (2003, chapter 1) for discussion of other countries 
where interest is paid on central- bank balances, and where variation in the administered deposit 
rate in accordance with changes in the central bank’s interest rate target plays an important 
role in the implementation of policy.
33. See the text explaining equations (1.2) and (1.3) of Woodford (2003, chapter 2) for further 
discussion. The ﬂ  ow budget constraint here is of exactly the same form as in a closed economy 
model, as purchases of foreign goods are included as part of the aggregate Ct and the prices of 
imported goods are included as part of the price index P t.44    Michael  Woodford
assets, and can suppose that households directly choose the state- contingent 
future payoﬀs that they prefer.34
One can alternatively write the ﬂ  ow budget constraint in the form35
(2.2)  P tCt    tMt   Et[Qt,t 1W t 1]   W t   P tYt   Tt,
where W t  (1   i m
t– 1)Mt– 1   At is the total value of nominal ﬁ  nancial wealth 
at the beginning of period t, and
 t  
it   it
m
 
1   it
is the interest- rate  diﬀerential between equally riskless, equally short-
 maturity  nonmonetary nominal assets (assumed not to yield any “liquidity 
services”) and money. (In the familiar textbook case of zero interest on 
money balances,  t is simply a monotonic transformation of the nominal 
interest rate it.) It is evident from (2.2) that the diﬀerential  t measures the 
opportunity cost of holding part of one’s wealth in monetary form. Conse-





    t
each period.
We can solve (2.3) for desired real money balances, obtaining
Mt  
P t









      mk m/ 
Yt




as an open economy generalization of the “LM equation” of a canonical 
closed economy model. Similar equations hold for the foreign country; in 




Pt∗     mk m/ 
Yt





where Mt∗ represents holdings of foreign-  currency money balances per 
foreign household, and  t∗ is the corresponding diﬀerential between the 
34. Our conclusions about money demand in this section do not depend on the assumption 
of complete markets; the ﬁ  rst- order condition (2.3) derived following for optimal money hold-
ings would also be obtained for an economy with no ﬁ  nancial assets other than money and a 
one-  period riskless nominal claim earning the interest rate it.
35. Again, see the discussion of equation (1.7) in Woodford (2003, chapter 2) for explana-
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foreign-  currency nominal interest rate it∗ and the interest rate it
m∗ paid by 
the foreign central bank.
If we represent the monetary policy of each central bank by a path for 
the monetary base (rather than a Taylor rule), as is often done in models of 
exchange rate determination, then the aggregate- demand block of the model 
(with producer- currency pricing) consists of equations (1.17) and (1.18) and 
(2.4) and (2.5): two equations for each country (an “IS equation” and an 
“LM equation”), that jointly suﬃce to determine the paths of {P t, Pt∗, it, it∗}, 
given paths for {Yt, Yt∗} and the policy variables {Mt, Mt∗, it
m, it
m∗}. Alterna-
tively, if we suppose that policy is speciﬁ  ed in each country by a Taylor rule, 
and adjustments of the monetary base (through open-  market purchases of 
securities) are simply used to implement the prescriptions of the Taylor rule, 
then equations (1.17) and (1.18) and (1.19) and (1.20) determine the rela-
tions between prices, interest rates, and real activity as before; but equations 
(2.4) and (2.5) must now also hold, and determine the adjustments of the 
monetary base and/  or the interest paid on base money that are required in 
order to implement the policies.
Local equilibrium determination can again be studied by log-  linearizing 
equations (2.4) and (2.5), yielding
(2.6) log  Mt   log P t    yY ˆ
t    ∗
yY ˆ
t∗    i(ı ˆt   ı ˆt
m),
(2.7) log  Mt∗   log Pt∗    yY ˆ
t    ∗
yY ˆ
t∗    i(ı ˆt∗   ı ˆt
m∗),
where
 y  (1    )
 m  
 
,   ∗
y   
 m  
 
,   i  
1     
 
    m.
Here I have log-  linearized around a zero-  inﬂ  ation steady state in which the 
rate of interest on money is assumed to satisfy
0   ı 
m     1   1,
as is necessary for the existence of such a steady state;
    1    (1   ı 
m)   0
is the implied steady-  state interest diﬀerential; and
ı ˆt
m  log
1   it
m
 
 1    ı 
m
is deﬁ  ned analogously with the previous deﬁ  nition of ı ˆt.36
36. The method and notation follow the treatment of a closed economy model in Woodford 
(2003, chapter 2, section 3.3). Note that I have also chosen units (as is possible without loss of gen-
erality) in which the steady- state level of real money balances is equal to 1 in each country, so that 
I can drop the constant that would otherwise appear in each of the equations (2.6) and (2.7).46    Michael  Woodford
One observes that to this order of approximation, the allowance for two 
distinct instruments of monetary policy (variations in the base and varia-
tions in the rate of interest paid on the base) is redundant. This follows 
from the fact that it is only the quantity log Mt –    iı ˆt
m that matters in equa-
tion (2.6). This means that any policy aim that can be achieved by varying 
the interest rate paid on money can alternatively be achieved through an 
appropriate adjustment of the monetary base.37 In the case of the very con-
ventional assumption made here about the nature of the demand for liquid-
ity, no underestimation of the scope for an independent national monetary 
policy results from stipulating that it
m   0 at all times, as is typically assumed 
in textbook treatments. One can then represent the monetary policies of the 
two countries simply in terms of the paths of the two countries’ monetary 
bases; that is, the supply of “liquidity” by the two central banks.
We see that openness results in the “LM equations” of the two economies’ 
being interrelated, just as was true (in general) of their “IS equations” in 
section 1.1. To what extent does it make sense, though, to say that in a glo-
balized economy, the supply of “global liquidity” should be an important 
determinant of equilibrium in each individual country? Suppose that we 
derive AD relations for each of the two countries, taking as given the paths 
of money for the two countries. We can do this by using each country’s IS 
relation to eliminate the nominal interest rate from its LM relation. We 
obtain a diﬀerence equation for the price level of the form
(1    i)log P t    iEt log P t 1   log Mt    iı ˆt
m   ( y    i  1)Y ˆ
t
w 
   i  1EtY ˆ w
t 1,
which can be solved forward to yield
(2.8)  log  P t   
j=0
 
∑(1    ) jEt[log Mt j    iı ˆm
t j] 
  [(1    ) y      1]Y ˆ
t
w   
j=1
 
∑(1    ) j[ y     1]EtY ˆ w
t j
for the equilibrium domestic price level corresponding to any expected paths 
of domestic and foreign output, where
   
 i  
1    i
   1.
(A similar equation holds for the foreign price level.)
We see that, conditioning on the paths of real activity in the two countries, 
37. Of course, there could nonetheless be practical advantages to the use of one technique 
over the other. For example, calculating the interest- rate eﬀect of a given size change in the rate 
of interest paid on base money is much more straightforward than guessing the size of open- 
market operation required to achieve the same eﬀect, especially in the presence of disturbances 
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the price level in a given country depends only on current and expected 
future monetary policy in that country alone, and not on “global liquidity” 
at all. (This is the same conclusion as we reached in section 1.1, when mon-
etary policy was instead speciﬁ  ed by a Taylor rule for each country.) Thus 
to the extent that monetary policy spillovers exist between countries, they 
do not occur through the aggregate demand side of the model, as the notion 
of “global liquidity” would suggest. And if we specify the supply side of the 
model in such a way that output is unaﬀected by monetary policy (for ex-
ample, by assuming ﬂ  exible wages and prices), it will follow that inﬂ  ation in 
one country will be completely independent of monetary policy in the other 
country, no matter how small the country in question may be.
If, instead, we assume the existence of nominal rigidities that allow mon-
etary policy to aﬀect real activity, foreign monetary policy will aﬀect inﬂ  a-
tion determination in the home country (assuming again that home country 
monetary policy is speciﬁ  ed by a given path for the monetary base). How-
ever, the spillovers that exist will not be of the sort suggested by the theory of 
“global liquidity.” We observe from (2.6) that a change in the level of foreign 
economic activity will shift the home country LM curve, for a given home 
money supply. But (since  ∗
y   0) expansionary policy in the foreign country, 
which raises Y∗, will have the same eﬀect as a contractionary monetary shock 
in the home country. This is because higher foreign output increases demand 
for the home currency at any given level of domestic output. Such an eﬀect 
is the opposite of the eﬀect that the “global liquidity” thesis would suggest.
1.2.2      Consequences of Currency Substitution
Some may suppose that the model presented previously fails to ﬁ  nd a role 
for “global liquidity” because of the conventional assumption that house-
holds in a given country obtain liquidity services only by holding the money 
issued by their own central bank (on the grounds that only this asset has a 
special role as a means of payment within those borders). What if globaliza-
tion also means global competition among media for executing payments? 
There is little evidence that this is already an important phenomenon at pres-
ent, but one might conjecture that it could happen in the future as a result of 
the same sorts of improvements in communications technology (and relax-
ation of regulations) that have already led to great increases in the degree 
of integration of ﬁ  nancial markets. To the extent that this were to occur, 
would some global liquidity aggregate, rather than the money supplied by 
the local central bank, become a primary determinant of aggregate demand 
in all countries? And if so, would this mean a loss of control over domestic 
inﬂ  ation by central banks, unless they arrange an appropriate worldwide 
coordination of their policies?
To clarify ideas, I shall proceed directly to the most extreme hypothetical, 
of a world in which each of the two central banks’ currencies supply liquidity 
services of exactly the same kind to households in either country. Would only 48    Michael  Woodford
“global liquidity” matter in that case? One possible case of this kind is that 
in which households in each country have the same utility function,
(2.9)  E0 
t=0
 
∑  tu(Ct)    w
MHt  
P t     ∗w
MFt  
Pt∗,
for some weights  ,  ∗   0, where w(m) is the same function as before. Here 
Ct is the household’s purchases of the world consumption aggregate, MHt 
is its holdings of the home currency, and MFt its holdings of the foreign 
currency. (This notation applies to the choices of a household in the home 
country. A foreign household has an identical utility function, but its choice 
variables are starred.) The liquidity services obtained from money balances 
depend on the purchasing power of those balances, in units of the world 
good (which is what the household cares about purchasing). Because the law 
of one price holds (in the PCP version of the model), the relevant measure of 
real balances for households in either country is obtained by deﬂ  ating home-
  currency balances by P t and deﬂ  ating foreign-  currency balances by Pt ∗.
In this case, households in each country choose to hold positive balances 
of both currencies, and the demand for the home currency by households 
in either country is of the form (2.4), with   replaced by the appropriate 
multiplicative factor. Total world demand for the home currency will then 
equal supply if and only if
 (1     )Mt   (1    )MHt    M∗
Ht
    (1    )  mL(Ct,  t)P t      mL(Ct∗,  t)P t
    (1    )  ˜ mk m/ 
Yt
(1  ) m/ Yt∗  m/ 
  
 t
 m P t,
where   ˜    / (1  –    ) m
– 1. This is an equilibrium relation of exactly the same 
form as (2.4), except that   is replaced by   ˜. The two equations are identi-
cal, even in scale, if     (1 –    ) m
– 1; but even if not, they have the same form 
(2.6) when log-  linearized. The condition for supply of the foreign currency 
to equal world demand for it similarly leads to an equilibrium condition of 
exactly the same form as (2.5). Hence the form of the two “LM equations” is 
exactly the same in this variant of the model, with exactly the same implica-
tions for the ability of a central bank to control domestic aggregate demand 
through the instruments of monetary policy.
Thus, the fact that independent variation in the supply of one currency 
inﬂ  uences the corresponding price level in the way indicated in (2.8) is not 
at all dependent on assuming that the advantages ﬂ  owing from holding a 
particular liquid asset are only available in one country. The only assumption 
that is essential is the assumption that the two currencies are not perfect sub-
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[2.9] imply that the elasticity of substitution between the two types of cash 
balances in the provision of liquidity services is only  m.)
A still more extreme assumption would be to suppose that the two kinds 
of money are instead perfect substitutes in liquidity provision. One might 
instead assume that households in each country have preferences of the 
form
(2.10)  E0 
t=0
 
∑  tu(Ct)   w
MHt  
P t
   
MFt  
Pt∗,
where w(m) is the same function as before. In this case, one would no lon-
ger be able to derive separate demand functions for the two currencies. All 
households will instead choose to hold only the currency with the lower 
opportunity cost; if positive quantities of both are supplied, equilibrium is 
only possible if
(2.11)   t    t ∗.
There will then be a well-  behaved demand function for the sum of the two 
types of real balances, and a corresponding equilibrium condition
(2.12) (1     )
Mt  
P t
    
Mt∗
 
Pt∗     mk m/ Yt




The pair of equilibrium conditions (2.11) and (2.12) would replace the con-
ditions (2.4) and (2.5) in the aggregate demand block of a model with perfect 
currency substitutability.
In this case, it really would be true that only “global liquidity” matters 
for aggregate demand determination; that is, the money supply of neither 
country would matter, except through its contribution to aggregate global 
real balances, deﬁ  ned by the left-  hand side of (2.12). In the case of a small 
country, the monetary base of which would make only a negligible contri-
bution to global real balances, variations in the monetary base would have 
essentially no eﬀect on aggregate demand there or elsewhere, and so would 
be irrelevant to domestic inﬂ  ation determination.
Nonetheless, it would not follow that a small country would be unable 
to use an independent monetary policy to control domestic inﬂ  ation. The 
reason is that in this case the additional instrument of policy, the possibility 
of varying the interest rate paid on money, would no longer be redundant. 
Condition (2.11), which can alternatively be written
1   it  
1   it∗   
1   it
m
 
1   it
m∗,
implies that the nominal interest-  rate diﬀerential between the two coun-
tries (for nonmonetary riskless assets) must be directly determined by the 
diﬀerential between the interest rates paid on money by the two central 50    Michael  Woodford
banks. This means that independent variation in the rate paid on money in 
a small country can inﬂ  uence aggregate nominal expenditure in that country, 
whether or not it is accompanied by changes in the monetary base. Thus, in 
a world in which the liabilities of diﬀerent central banks came to be close 
substitutes for one another in facilitating transactions worldwide, it would 
become essential to use variations in the (administratively determined) inter-
est yield on base money as the means through which central- bank operating 
targets for domestic short-  term nominal interest rates are implemented.38
As a simple example of how inﬂ  ation control would be possible using this 
instrument, consider a small open economy (i.e., one for which   is essen-
tially equal to 1), so that monetary policy decisions of the small country can 
have no eﬀect on the evolution of foreign variables such as Pt∗, Yt∗, it∗, or it
m∗. 
It follows from (2.12) that the small country’s policy will be unable to aﬀect 
the value of  t either. Nonetheless, the small country’s central bank can set 
the interest rate it
m on the domestic monetary base as it pleases. Suppose that 
it sets it in accordance with a reaction function of the form
ı ˆt
m   ı t      t,
where ı t is an exogenous process with respect to the evolution of domestic 
variables, but may depend on the evolution of foreign variables.
Then subtracting (1.22) from (1.21), and using the log-  linearized version 
of (2.11) to replace the interest-  rate diﬀerential ı ˆt –   ı ˆt∗ by ı ˆt
m –   ı ˆt
m∗, we obtain 
the equilibrium relation
ı ˆt
m   ı ˆt
m∗   Et( t 1    ∗
t 1).
Substituting the reaction function for ı ˆt
m, we ﬁ  nd that in equilibrium, the 
domestic inﬂ  ation process must satisfy
   t   Et t 1   (ı ˆt
m∗   Et ∗
t 1   ı t).
In the case that      1, this has a unique bounded solution,
(2.13)   t   
j=0
 
∑   
 ( j 1)Et(ı ˆm∗
t j    ∗
t j 1   ı t j).
This shows that variations in the rate of interest paid on the monetary 
base can still be eﬀectively used to control the domestic rate of inﬂ  ation, 
even under the assumption that the liabilities of diﬀerent central banks are 
equally useful as sources of liquidity in all parts of the world. It is true that 
in such a world, foreign developments would matter for inﬂ  ation determina-
38. This is already a crucial element in monetary policy implementation in countries with 
“channel systems” like Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, and their success indicates that 
it would remain entirely feasible to conduct a national interest rate policy without any ability 
to alter the spread between the returns on nonmonetary assets and base money. See discussion 
in Woodford (2001) of the related issue of monetary policy implementation in a world where 
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tion in the small country, and the interest paid on money would have to be 
adjusted so as to oﬀset those developments, in order for a stable inﬂ  ation 
rate to be maintained in the small country. But even so, it is not true that 
the central bank’s main problem would be oﬀsetting the inﬂ  ationary impact 
of variations in “global liquidity.” One sees from (2.13) that what the cen-
tral bank actually needs to oﬀset is variations in the real rate of return on 
money balances in the rest of the world. Moreover, it is increases rather than 
decreases in the real return on money elsewhere in the world that would be 
inﬂ  ationary in the small country, if not oﬀset by a corresponding increase 
in the interest paid on money in the small country.
Of course, “dollarization” does imply reduced eﬃcacy of domestic mon-
etary policy in a small open economy in one respect, if it means not only 
that the foreign currency can be used a means of payment (and so supplies 
liquidity services), but also that prices of domestic goods are quoted in, and 
sticky in, the foreign currency rather than the domestic currency. In that 
case, it would remain true that domestic monetary policy should be able 
to stabilize the purchasing power of the domestic currency, but this would 
no longer imply an ability to eliminate the distortions due to price stickiness 
in the domestic economy.39 Indeed, if few domestic goods continue to be 
priced in terms of the domestic currency, then the stability or otherwise of 
the value of that currency would cease to have any real consequences, and 
cease to have any welfare consequences—domestic monetary policy would 
indeed be irrelevant. But this is hardly an inevitable result of globalization, 
even under the assumption that eventually multiple currencies might come 
to be widely accepted as means of payment in a given location. When one 
observes prices being ﬁ  xed in a currency other than the local currency, this is 
typically because the purchasing power of the local currency is expected to 
be less stable than that of the foreign currency; a central bank that stabilizes 
a domestic price index in terms of its own currency has little reason to fear 
that domestic prices will cease to be ﬁ  xed in that currency, even if the costs 
of transacting in foreign currencies are reduced.
1.3      ”Global Slack” and Inﬂ  ation Determination
Thus far I have discussed only the aggregate demand block of an open 
economy macroeconomic model, asking how monetary policy aﬀects the 
equilibrium inﬂ  ation rate that would be associated with any given path for 
real activity. This has meant leaving aside the question of the extent to which 
a given eﬀect of national monetary policy on the aggregate demand relation 
should result in a diﬀerent rate of inﬂ  ation as opposed to a diﬀerent level 
of real activity. If we are willing to assume that the level of real activity 
in each country should be determined by factors such as technology and 
39. This has been stressed by David Romer, in a comment on an earlier draft.52    Michael  Woodford
preferences, quite independently of monetary policy in either country (as 
real business cycle theories assert), then the analysis previously given would 
already oﬀer a complete answer to the question of how monetary policy 
aﬀects inﬂ  ation in a globalized economy. But in the presence of nominal 
rigidities this will not be true, and we need to consider the “aggregate supply 
block” of the model as well in order to determine the eﬀects of monetary 
policy on either output or inﬂ  ation.
The question of how globalization should aﬀect aggregate supply rela-
tions—the connection that should exist between inﬂ  ation and real activity as 
a result of the way that the incentives that ﬁ  rms have to change their prices 
vary depending on the degree of utilization of productive capacity—is of 
considerable interest in its own right. It is sometimes argued that increased 
international trade in goods and services should make inﬂ  ation in any coun-
try more a function of “global slack”—the balance that exists between 
worldwide productive capacity and world demand—than of the balance 
between demand and capacity in that country alone. Economists at the Bank 
for International Settlements (BIS) in particular (Borio and Filardo 2007) 
have argued that in a globalized economy, domestic slack alone should mat-
ter less than global slack as a determinant of domestic inﬂ  ation, and have 
suggested that there is evidence that this is already true to some extent. (See, 
however, Ihrig et al. [2007] for a contrary view of the empirical evidence.)
To the extent that this thesis is correct, one might expect it to pose a threat 
to central bank control of domestic inﬂ  ation, even granting our previous 
conclusions about the continued inﬂ  uence of national monetary policy over 
aggregate demand. In particular, one might suppose that even if domestic 
monetary policy can aﬀect aggregate demand for domestic output, if the 
domestic output gap ceases to be a signiﬁ  cant determinant of inﬂ  ation, a 
national central bank will cease to have much ability to inﬂ  uence the domes-
tic inﬂ  ation rate, which will instead depend primarily on the international 
factors that determine “global slack.” Thus, one might expect national mon-
etary policy to become ineﬀective in controlling inﬂ  ation, especially in the 
case of a small country that can contribute little to either world demand 
or world productive capacity. Our conclusions about the continued signiﬁ  -
cance of national monetary policy for aggregate demand would presumably 
then imply that monetary policy should have an even greater eﬀect on real 
activity in a globalized economy—but this would be little comfort to those 
concerned about inﬂ  ation risk.
Indeed, under the “global slack” hypothesis, the eﬃcacy of domestic mon-
etary policy in aﬀecting the level of real activity, without any notable eﬀect 
on domestic inﬂ  ation, might be expected to lead to monetary policies in each 
country with joint consequences for global slack that are more inﬂ  ationary 
than any country would like. Even if one were to grant that central banks 
should still be able to control inﬂ  ation, one might fear that they will have less 
incentive to do so if they perceive themselves to face a ﬂ  atter Phillips-  curve Globalization and Monetary Control    5 3
trade- oﬀ between domestic output expansion and domestic inﬂ  ation. (This 
is presumably the reason for the concern of Borio and Filardo that a “more 
elastic” economy will encourage a loss of monetary discipline.)
In this section, I consider the degree of concern that should be given to 
threats of this kind by analyzing the consequences of openness in goods 
and factor markets for aggregate-  supply relations in a model with nominal 
rigidities. I give particular attention to the consequences of openness for the 
slope of the Phillips curve trade- oﬀ, and also to the degree to which it is true 
that domestic inﬂ  ation should be determined by “global slack” as opposed 
to (or in addition to) a domestic output gap. I begin by reviewing the answers 
to these questions in the canonical two-  country model of CGG, and then 
consider some variations on that model that might be expected to increase 
the importance of “global slack.”
1.3.1      Aggregate Supply In a Two-  Country Model
A variety of arguments have been given for the view that world economic 
activity, rather than domestic activity alone, should be important for inﬂ  a-
tion determination in a globalized economy. Bernanke (2007) interprets the 
global slack hypothesis as a simple observation that if domestic products are 
sold in global markets, global income (rather than domestic income alone) 
will become an important determinant of the demand for those products and 
hence, of the incentives that domestic producers have to raise their prices. 
Note that under this interpretation it is still the domestic output gap (the 
balance between the demand for domestic products and domestic produc-
tive capacity) that determines domestic inﬂ  ation, rather than any concept of 
global slack; but global income aﬀects domestic inﬂ  ation insofar as it may 
be an important determinant—perhaps even the main determinant—of 
domestic aggregate demand.
This mechanism is one that we have already considered in the analysis 
of aggregate demand in section 1.1. In the model of consumer demand in 
a globalized economy presented there, the demand for any given product 
does indeed depend on world income rather than domestic income, since 
households in both countries are assumed to allocate their expenditure 
across diﬀerent goods in precisely the same proportions. (This is obviously 
an extreme assumption that gives the greatest possible weight to the consid-
eration raised by Bernanke.) But this obviously has no consequences for the 
slope of the Phillips curve, and as already shown in the earlier discussion, 
it does not imply any reduction in the eﬀectiveness of domestic monetary 
policy in controlling domestic inﬂ  ation. The eﬀects of monetary policy on 
domestic inﬂ  ation do not decline in the case that   is made large, even though 
this means that nearly all of the demand for domestic products is foreign 
demand.
Another argument that similarly does not depend on any denial of the link 
between the domestic output gap and domestic inﬂ  ation (here understood to 54    Michael  Woodford
be the rate of increase of the prices of domestically produced goods), is to 
observe that in a globalized economy, a larger part of the consumption bas-
ket in the domestic economy will consist of imported goods. Even if domes-
tic inﬂ  ation depends solely on the domestic output gap, a broader measure 
of CPI inﬂ  ation will also depend on the rate of growth of import prices. A 
naive argument might suggest that just as domestic inﬂ  ation depends on the 
domestic output gap, the rate of growth of the prices of foreign goods should 
depend on the foreign output gap (which would therefore also matter for 
domestic CPI inﬂ  ation, and would arguably be the main thing that should 
matter in the case of a small country that consumes mainly foreign goods). 
This would be incorrect, as it neglects the eﬀects of exchange rate changes. 
Nonetheless, CPI inﬂ  ation should depend on changes in the terms of trade 
in addition to the determinants of domestic inﬂ  ation, and the equilibrium 
terms of trade should depend on foreign output (though not the foreign 
output gap).
But the main argument of proponents of the global slack hypothesis 
seems to be that in a globalized economy, the domestic output gap ceases 
to be the sole determinant of the incentive that domestic ﬁ  rms have to raise 
their prices. There are a variety of reasons why the simple relation between 
real marginal cost (more precisely, the ratio of the marginal cost of domes-
tic production to the price of domestic products, and hence the incentive 
of domestic ﬁ  rms to change their prices) and the domestic output gap that 
holds in a closed economy model will generally not hold in an open economy 
model. Even in the simple model of CGG, where the only variable factor 
is labor and there is no international mobility of labor, real wage demands 
should not depend solely on domestic production. This is because of the 
way in which the representative household’s marginal utility of income (in 
units of domestic goods) depends both on the quantity consumed of foreign 
as well as domestic goods and on the terms of trade. These factors result in 
the presence, in general, of foreign-  output terms in the domestic aggregate-
  supply equation of a canonical two-  country model.
Here I present a basic model that essentially recapitulates the results of 
CGG before turning to an alternative model that incorporates an additional 
reason for world economic activity to matter. The demand side of the model 
is the one already explained in section 1.1.1. The home economy consists of 
a continuum (of length 1 –    ) of households, indexed by h. Each of these 
seeks to maximize40
(3.1)  E0 
t=0
 
∑  t[u(Ct)   v(Ht; H  t)],
40. Here I again abstract from the liquidity services that may be provided by money balances, 
as in section 1.1. Adding additional terms to the utility function, as in (2.1), would make no 
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where the utility from consumption u(C) is again deﬁ  ned by (1.2) and (1.3), 
Ht is hours worked, H  t is an exogenous preference shock,41 and the disutility 
of working is assumed to be of the form
v(H; H )   
1
 





for some     0. For now I shall assume, like CGG, that ﬁ  rms hire labor only 
from households in their own country.
Assuming for simplicity a competitive spot market for labor, the prefer-
ences (3.1) imply that in each period, the labor supply of each household 
is given by






where W t is home country nominal wage. We can alternatively invert this 
relation to write the real wage as a function of per capita labor demand, 
obtaining
(3.3) 
W t  
P t






In each country, there is assumed to be a continuum of length 1 of 
diﬀerentiated goods produced; thus CHt is a Dixit-  Stiglitz constant elastic-
ity of substitution (CES) aggregate of the quantities consumed of the con-
tinuum of goods produced in the home country (and similarly for CFt). It 
follows as usual that optimal allocation of expenditure across goods implies 
a per capita demand for each good given by






where Yt is the per capita demand for the composite home good (as in sec-
tion 1.1), pt(i) is the price of individual home good i, P Ht is the Dixit-  Stiglitz 
index of home goods prices
(3.5)  PHt
1    
1
0
 pt(i)1  di
41. The preference shock H  t is introduced in order to allow for a country- speciﬁ  c labor supply 
shock. Clarida, Galí, and Gertler allow for one, but in their model it is interpreted as exog-
enous variation in a “wage markup,” due to variation in the elasticity of substitution between 
the diﬀerent types of labor supplied by monopolistically competitive households, rather than 
a preference shock. The assumption of a preference shock here is more conventional, and 
in addition the assumption here of perfect substitutability of the labor supplied by diﬀerent 
households facilitates the discussion of the consequences of globalization of the labor market 
in the next section. The diﬀerence between the two types of labor-  supply shocks would be 
important in an analysis of optimal stabilization policy, but that is not the concern of this 
chapter.56    Michael  Woodford
already introduced in section 1.1, and     1 is the elasticity of substitution 
among these goods.
Let us suppose further that the producer of each diﬀerentiated good i has 
a production function of the form
(3.6)  yt(i)   Atht(i)1/ ,
where At is a productivity factor common to all of the ﬁ  rms in the same 
country, ht(i) is the labor input hired by ﬁ  rm i, and     1. Here I generalize 
the speciﬁ  cation of CGG to allow for the possibility of diminishing returns 
to the labor input; the case     1 can be interpreted as a technology with 
constant returns to scale in capital and labor, but with the capital stock of 
each ﬁ  rm ﬁ  xed, as discussed in Woodford (2003, chapter 3). It follows that 
the labor demanded by each ﬁ  rm will equal












   
,
using the demand curve (3.4) to express the ﬁ  rm’s sales as a function of its 
price. Similarly, the aggregate demand for labor in the home country will 
equal
(3.7)  Ht   
1
0
 ht(i)di   











   
di   1
is a measure of the dispersion of home goods prices (achieving its minimum 
value of 1 if and only if all home goods have identical prices).
The producer of each diﬀerentiated good is assumed to adjust the price 
of the goods only at random intervals, as in the model of staggered pricing 
introduced by Calvo (1983). Let us suppose that a fraction 0       1 of the 
producers leave the prices of their goods unchanged each period; those that 




∑  T tQt,T[pt(i)yT(i)   C(yT(i); WT, AT)],
where





is the (nominal) cost of producing quantity yt(i), subject to the constraint 
that the ﬁ  rm’s sales will be given by (3.4) in each period. (Here the ﬁ  rm treats 
the evolution of the variables {Yt, P t, W t} as independent of its own pricing 
decision, because it is small compared to the overall markets for domestic Globalization and Monetary Control    5 7
goods and labor.) The optimal price pt(i) that is chosen then satisﬁ  es a ﬁ  rst-
  order condition of the form
(3.8)  Et 
Tt =
 
∑  T tQt,TyT(i)[pt(i)     ˜MCT(i)]   0,
where MCt(i) is the (nominal) marginal cost of production by ﬁ  rm i in period 
t, and   ˜    / (  –  1)   1 is each ﬁ  rm’s desired markup of price over marginal 
cost. Thus, the price that is chosen is   ˜ times a weighted average of the mar-
ginal cost that is anticipated at each of the future dates at which the currently 
chosen price may still apply.
Finally, substitution of (3.3) for the wage in the cost function, and (3.7) 
for the demand for labor in the resulting expression, allows us to derive an 
expression of the form





for the marginal cost of production of ﬁ  rm i, where






1  H t
   t
 
is a geometric average of the marginal costs of all home ﬁ  rms, and I deﬁ  ne 
the new coeﬃcients42
   (1    )    1    p      1   0.
In the case of a closed economy model, one would furthermore equate 
Ct with Yt, so that (3.10) would imply an elasticity of average real marginal 
cost with respect to output of      – 1, as in Woodford (2003, chapter 3). 
In the open economy model of CGG, instead, Ct must equal the right-  hand 
side of (1.15).43 Using this relation to substitute for Ct in (3.10), one obtains 
the alternative expression
MCt    k  1P t
Yt
    1(1  )Yt∗  1 
  
At
1  H t
   t
 .
(Note that this reduces to the closed economy marginal cost function in the 
case that     0.) We can instead write marginal cost purely as a function of 
42. Here the notation follows Woodford (2003, chapter 3), where these coeﬃcients are deﬁ  ned 
in the case of more general utility and production functions. The ﬁ  rst inequality is strict unless 
v   0 (no increasing marginal disutility of work), and the second inequality is strict unless   
  1 (no diminishing returns to labor).
43. Here I assume that Ct   Ct∗   Ct
w. It has already been shown in section 1.1.1 that the 
ratio Ct/  Ct∗ must be constant over time, as the growth rate of consumption must always be 
the same in both countries. If one assumes an appropriate initial wealth distribution (i.e., zero 
initial net foreign assets for each country), the constant ratio is equal to 1, so that one must 
have Ct     Ct∗   Ct
w. Even without this assumption, Ct would always be a ﬁ  xed proportion of 
Ct
w, so that the asserted conclusion about the marginal cost function would still hold, up to a 
multiplicative constant.58    Michael  Woodford
domestic goods prices and real variables by using (1.34) to substitute for P t 
in the previous expression, yielding
(3.11)  MCt   
 
 
k1   1P Ht
Yt
    1  (1   1)Yt∗ (  1 1)
   
At
1  H t
   t
 .
Substituting (3.9) for MCt(i) in (3.8), and using (3.4) to substitute for the 
relative output of ﬁ  rm i, one obtains an alternative expression for the ﬁ  rst-
  order condition for optimal price setting,
(3.12)  Et 
Tt =
 
∑  T tQt,TY TP 
HT[pt
†(1  p )     ˜MCTPH
 p
T
 ]   0.
Here I have introduced the notation pt
† for the optimal price for a ﬁ  rm that 
reconsiders its price at date t—the quantity called pt(i) in 3.8—as we see that 
condition (3.8) is the same for all ﬁ  rms i that reconsider their prices at that 
date, and we may assume that they all choose the same price. It then follows 
from the deﬁ  nition (3.5) that the domestic price index evolves according to 
a law of motion
(3.13)  PHt
1      PHt
1  
 1   (1    )pt
†(1  ),
and similarly from the deﬁ  nition of  t that the price-  dispersion measure 
evolves according to a law of motion
(3.14)   t   
P Ht  
P Ht 1





   .
We can further reduce the set of endogenous variables referred to in these 
equations if we replace Qt,T in (3.12) by
(3.15)  Qt,T    
Yt  
YT





 (  1 1) P Ht  
P HT
.
This follows from (1.16), using (1.34) to substitute for the consumer price 
indexes.
The aggregate-  supply block of equations for the home economy then 
consists of the equations (3.11) through (3.14).44 These equations jointly 
determine the paths of the domestic variables {MCt, pt
†, P Ht,  t} consistent 
with optimal price-  setting by each of the domestic ﬁ  rms, given assumed 
paths for the levels of real activity {Yt, Yt∗} and initial conditions P H,– 1,  – 1. 
The implied path of the consumer price index is then given by
(3.16)  P t   k 1P HtYt
 Yt∗  ,
which is implied by (1.34). Alternatively, we may think of the aggregate-
  supply relations as determining the paths of the variables {Yt, MCt, pt
†,  t} 
for given paths of {P Ht} (or {P t}) and foreign real activity.
44. Here it should be understood that Qt,T has been substituted out in (3.12), using (3.15).Globalization and Monetary Control    5 9
Here I have written the aggregate- supply equations for the home country; 
but a set of equations of the same form applies to the foreign country. For 
example, (3.10) also holds when all variables (both endogenous and exog-
enous) are replaced by the corresponding starred variables.45 Substitutions 
similar to the ones above then lead to
(3.17)  MCt∗   
 
 
k1   1 P∗
Ft
Yt∗    1 (1  )(1   1)Yt
(1  )(  1 1)
    
At∗1  H t∗   t∗ 
as a relation corresponding to (3.11) for producers in the foreign country. 
Equations corresponding to (3.12) through (3.14) for the foreign country 
are similarly straightforward to derive.46 The complete set of eight equations 
(four for each country) constitutes the “aggregate supply block” of the two-
 country model. These equations determine the evolution of domestic prices 
(and hence the indexes P Ht and P∗
Ft) in both countries, and the consumer price 
indexes P t and Pt∗ as well, given the paths of real activity in both countries. 
Alternatively, they can be viewed as determining the evolution of real activ-
ity in both countries given the paths of the general level of prices (speciﬁ  ed by 
either a domestic price index or a consumer price index) in both countries.
We observe that even in this model with full integration of goods mar-
kets (not only are all ﬁ  nal goods traded, but the same consumption basket 
is consumed in all parts of the world), foreign variables do not aﬀect the 
aggregate- supply relations for a given country, except in one respect. This is 
the relation (3.11) between real activity and the marginal cost of domestic 
production. Marginal cost depends on foreign production as well as domes-
tic production because the wage demanded by domestic households depends 
not only on the marginal disutility of labor (which depends only on domestic 
production, under the present assumption of no international trade in fac-
tors of production), but also on the marginal utility of additional income (in 
units of the domestic currency). The marginal utility of domestic-  currency 
income depends on foreign variables for two reasons. For a given level of 
domestic production (and hence of consumption of home- produced goods), 
a higher level of foreign output will mean a higher level of consumption of 
foreign goods, hence a higher level of consumption of the world composite 
good, and a lower marginal utility of consumption, or marginal utility of 
income in units of the world composite good. At the same time, a higher level 
of foreign output will mean an appreciation of the home country’s terms of 
trade, and hence a higher marginal of utility of income in units of domestic 
goods relative to the marginal utility of income in units of the world good.
Since the two eﬀects have opposite signs, there is a tendency for them 
45. Here I allow the technology shock and labor supply shock to be diﬀerent in the two 
countries.
46. In each case, one obtains the corresponding equation for the foreign country by add-
ing stars to all variables, replacing Hs by Fs, and replacing   by 1 –     in each place where it 
occurs.60    Michael  Woodford
to cancel one another. In fact, in the case that     1 exactly (log utility of 
consumption), the two eﬀects completely cancel, and we observe that (3.11) 
does not involve any foreign variables. (Similarly, in this case [3.17] does 
not involve any home-  country variables.) In this case, the aggregate-  supply 
trade- oﬀ between P Ht and Yt takes exactly the same form as in a closed econ-
omy: no foreign variables shift this trade-  oﬀ, and the slope of the trade-  oﬀ 
(as well as its sensitivity to domestic shocks or to shifts in expectations) is 
independent of the degree of openness  , since the value of   aﬀects none of 
the equations in the aggregate- supply block in this case. Since we have noted 
in section 1.1.2 that in this case the aggregate-  demand relation between P Ht 
and Yt is also unaﬀected by foreign variables, or by the economy’s degree 
of openness (as long as domestic monetary policy is of the form [1.41]), it 
follows that in this special case we obtain a complete theory of the determi-
nation of domestic inﬂ  ation, output, and interest rates that is independent 
of the economy’s degree of openness.47
In general, of course, the two eﬀects need not cancel altogether. The 
most empirically realistic case, however, is that in which     1, as discussed 
in section 1.1.2. In this case, the terms-  of-  trade eﬀect is stronger than the 
marginal- utility- of- consumption  eﬀect, and on net, an increase in foreign 
output reduces the marginal cost of domestic production. While this makes 
foreign economic activity relevant to the determination of (supply-  side) 
inﬂ  ationary pressures in the home country, the sign of the eﬀect is not the 
one predicted by the “global slack” thesis. Not only is it not only world 
activity that matters for domestic inﬂ  ationary pressure, but foreign activity 
has an eﬀect with the opposite sign of the eﬀect of domestic activity. And 
rather than implying a reduced slope of the aggregate- supply curve as a con-
sequence of increased openness, this channel implies that greater openness 
should increase the slope of the aggregate- supply relation between domestic 
inﬂ  ation and domestic output.
In order to see directly the implications of the previous equations for 
the aggregate-  supply relation, it is useful to log-  linearize them, as with the 
aggregate-  demand block of the model in section 1.1. Following CGG (and 
the literature on the closed economy “new-  Keynesian Phillips curve”), I 
shall log-  linearize them around an allocation with zero inﬂ  ation and zero 
price dispersion in both countries, as well as constant preferences and tech-
nology (identical in the two countries). As in the closed economy model,48 
log-  linearization of (3.12) and (3.13) leads to the equation49
47. Benigno and Benigno (2005) generalize this result to the case in which the elasticity of 
substitution between home and foreign goods in the preferences of households is not necessarily 
equal to 1, as assumed here and in CGG. In their more general model, domestic inﬂ  ation and out-
put are determined independently of foreign variables in the case that the intertemporal elasticity 
of substitution   is equal to the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods.
48. See Woodford (2003, chapter 3) for details of the derivation.
49. Note that this is just the equation (1.47) already anticipated in section 1.1.3. The deriva-
tion of this equation is the same in the case of a model with local- currency pricing, though the 
relation between marginal cost and output is diﬀerent.Globalization and Monetary Control    6 1
(3.18)   Ht   ξ(    log MCt   log P Ht)    Et Ht 1
for the evolution of the domestic price index, where    log   ˜ and
ξ  
(1    )(1     )
  
 (1    p )
   0.
Substituting (3.11) for MCt in (3.18), we obtain
(3.19)    Ht   κHY ˆ
t   κFY ˆ
t∗    Et Ht 1   ξ qt
as an open economy generalization of the new-  Keynesian Phillips curve. 
Here Y ˆ
t and Y ˆ
t∗ are log deviations from a steady-  state level of output as in 
section 1.1, and the steady-  state output level Y  is now deﬁ  ned by the rela-
tion50
Y 
    1   
k1   1
 
   ˜
A1  H 
 ,
where A, H  are the common steady- state values of the technology and pref-
erence factors in the two countries. The exogenous disturbance term qt indi-
cates the percentage change in domestic output that is required to maintain 
the marginal disutility of supplying output at its steady-  state level;51 it is 
deﬁ  ned as
 qt  (1    )at    h t,
where at  log(At/  A), h t  log(H  t/H ). Note that in this simple model (with-
out government purchases or variation in impatience to consume, for ex-
ample), qt is also proportional to the log deviation of the equilibrium level 
of output in a closed economy model with ﬂ  exible wages and prices, or the 
“natural rate” of output deﬁ  ned in Woodford (2003, chapter 4); it follows 
from the formulas given there that in the present model,
 qt   κY ˆ
t
n,
where κ  ξ(     – 1) is the slope of the closed economy AS curve. Finally, 
it follows directly from (3.11) that the two output elasticities in the open 
economy AS relation are given by
 κ H   ξ[      1    (1     1)],
 κ F    ξ (1     1).
For the foreign country, we similarly obtain
(3.20)   ∗
Ft   κ∗
HY ˆ
t   κ∗
FY ˆ
t∗    Et ∗
Ft 1   ξ qt ∗,
50. One can easily show that Yt   Yt∗   Y  is the condition under which one will have both 
  ˜ MCt   P Ht and   ˜ MCt∗   P∗
Ft, as is required for a steady state with zero inﬂ  ation in both 
countries.
51. Here again I follow the notation used in Woodford (2003, chapter 4) for the closed 
economy model.62    Michael  Woodford
where
 κ ∗
H    ξ(1    )(1     1),
 κ ∗
F   ξ[      1   (1    )(1     1)],
and qt ∗ is the corresponding compound of the foreign technology and prefer-
ence shocks. Equations (3.19) and (3.20) then represent the aggregate supply 
block of the log-  linearized model. Together, they suﬃce to determine the 
paths of { Ht,  ∗
Ft} given the paths of {Yt, Yt∗}, or vice versa. The CPI inﬂ  a-
tion rates are also determined if we adjoin the relations
(3.21)   t    Ht    ( Y ˆ
t    Y ˆ
t∗),   t∗    ∗
Ft   (1    )( Y ˆ
t∗    Y ˆ
t)
implied by (3.16) and the corresponding relation for the foreign index.
In the case that the monetary policies of the two central banks are given by 
equations of the form (1.19) and (1.20), then, as shown in section 1.1.1, the 
log-  linearized AD block of the model consists of equations (1.21) through 
(1.24). If we combine these with the log-  linearized AS block consisting of 
equations (3.19) through (3.21), we have a system of eight equations per 
period to determine the eight endogenous variables { t,  Ht, Y ˆ
t, ı ˆt,  t ∗,  ∗
Ft, 
Y ˆ
t∗, ı ˆt∗} each period. In the case that the response coeﬃcients of the two 
policy rules satisfy certain inequalities, this system has a determinate equilib-
rium, and when it does, we are able to solve for each of the eight endogenous 
variables as a function of current and expected future values of the forcing 
variables {ı t, ı t∗, qt, qt∗}, and the lagged relative output Y ˆ r
t– 1  Y ˆ
t– 1 –   Y ˆ∗
t– 1.52 
For example, the solution for equilibrium consumer price inﬂ  ation in the 
home country will be of the form
(3.22)   t   
j=0
 
∑[ 1,jEtı  t j    2,jEtı ∗
t j    3,jEtY ˆn
t j    4,jEtY ˆn∗
t j]    Y ˆr
t 1.
To what extent do our results imply that globalization should be expected 
to change the nature of the aggregate-  supply relation in each country? One 
should note ﬁ  rst of all that, once again, ﬁ  nancial globalization has no eﬀect 
whatsoever in this model. As discussed in section 1.1, under the preferences 
assumed here, the equilibrium relation between consumption in each coun-
try (and each country’s stochastic discount factor) and the world pattern 
of production is the same whether we assume ﬁ  nancial autarchy, complete 
international risk-  sharing, or any kind of incomplete markets or costly 
international trade in ﬁ  nancial assets. Hence the derivation of the previous 
aggregate-  supply relations is unaﬀected by which of these we assume.53
52. Note that this is the only lagged state variable that appears in any of the eight structural 
equations; it appears in (3.21).
53. This contrasts with the result of Razin and Yuen (2002). These authors do not assume 
the same preferences as are assumed here (they instead assume the same elasticity of substitu-
tion     1 between home and foreign goods as exists among individual home goods or among 
individual foreign goods), but this is not the main reason for the diﬀering conclusion. Razin Globalization and Monetary Control    6 3
What about the eﬀects of an increase in the degree of integration of 
goods markets, here modeled by an increase in  ? Figure 1.6 illustrates 
the numerical values of the four sequences of coeﬃcients { k,j} in (3.22) 
in the case of policy rules for each country in which      2,  y   1, as 
also assumed in ﬁ  gure 1.1, with values for the other structural parameters 
Fig. 1.6  Coeﬃcients of the solution (3.22) for inﬂ  ation, for alternative degrees of 
openness
and Yuen note that under ﬁ  nancial autarchy, consumption each period must ﬂ  uctuate with 
domestic income, and assume as a consequence that C ˆ
t   Y ˆ
t, whereas C ˆ
t   C ˆ
t∗ (as here) in the 
case of ﬁ  nancial integration. They therefore conclude that domestic consumption (and cor-
respondingly the marginal utility of income of domestic households) will be less sensitive to 
variations in domestic output in the case of ﬁ  nancial integration, making domestic real wage 
demands less sensitive to domestic output in that case, and hence the slope of the Phillips curve 
smaller. But their argument neglects the eﬀect of terms-  of-  trade changes, which vary with 
the relative output of the two countries in such a way as to make the number of units of the 
consumption basket that can be purchased with the income from domestic production vary less 
than does domestic output. In the case of a unit elasticity of substitution between home and 
foreign goods, as assumed here, the terms-  of-  trade eﬀect completely eliminates any diﬀerence 
between the eﬀects of variations in Yt on consumption in the two countries, even under ﬁ  nancial 
autarchy. Under the preferences assumed by Razin and Yuen, the terms-  of-  trade eﬀect would 
be smaller, but will still reduce the degree to which ﬁ  nancial integration aﬀects the slope of the 
Phillips curve, relative to what they ﬁ  nd.64    Michael  Woodford
again taken from the closed economy model of Rotemberg and Woodford 
(1997).54 Once again the ﬁ  gure compares the solutions obtained for three 
diﬀerent values of  . We observe that even in the case of completely inte-
grated goods markets and ﬁ  nancial markets, individual national monetary 
policies still have a substantial eﬀect on the rate of CPI inﬂ  ation in that coun-
try. Indeed, the upper left panel of ﬁ  gure 1.6 shows that the immediate eﬀect 
on inﬂ  ation of a relatively transitory shift in monetary policy is (at least in 
the calibrated example) even larger in the case of a highly open economy 
than in the case of an otherwise similar closed economy. Hence, whatever 
other validity there may be to the “global slack” thesis, openness does not 
reduce the ability of a central bank to inﬂ  uence the local rate of inﬂ  ation.
1.3.2      Global Economic Activity and Inﬂ  ation
Nonetheless, our previous results do show that the aggregate supply block 
of our model, like the aggregate demand block, is aﬀected by the degree of 
openness of the economy. Equations (3.19) and (3.20) each indicate that in 
general the other country’s level of economic activity is relevant to the deter-
mination of a given country’s domestic inﬂ  ation rate. To what extent do they 
support the view that “global slack” becomes an important determinant of 
inﬂ  ation in each country as a result of economic integration?
It is true that for analytical purposes, it may be convenient to solve a model 
of this kind by ﬁ  rst solving for the implied dynamics of “global” endogenous 
variables, and then solving for national departures from the world averages 
taking the solution for the world averages as given. Note that (3.21) implies 
that the world average inﬂ  ation rate  t
w (deﬁ  ned as in [1.44]) can also be 
written as a world average of domestic inﬂ  ation rates,
 t
w   (1    ) Ht     ∗
Ft.
It then follows that we can take a weighted average of (3.19) and (3.20) and 
obtain
(3.23)   t
w   κ(Y ˆ
t
w   Y ˆ
t
nw)    Et w
t 1
as a “global Phillips curve” relation. Here Y ˆ
t
w is the world average level of 
output (deﬁ  ned as in [1.45]), and Y ˆ
t
nw is a corresponding average of the closed 
economy “natural rates of output” for the two economies.
Thus, one can argue that “global inﬂ  ation” is determined by a “global 
output gap” in this model. In the case that the Taylor rule coeﬃcients are 
the same in both countries, the aggregate-  demand block of the model also 
allows us to derive relation (1.56) between world inﬂ  ation and world output 
that does not involve any nation-  speciﬁ  c variables. Equations (1.56) and 
54. In addition to the parameter values used in the previous numerical illustrations, I now 
also assume that κ   0.0236.Globalization and Monetary Control    6 5








In the case of identical Taylor rule coeﬃcients in the two countries, it 
is also possible to solve independently for the evolution of the inﬂ  ation 
diﬀerential  zt between the two countries. From (3.21) it follows that
 zt    Ht    ∗
Ft   ( Yt    Yt∗).
Then subtracting (3.20) from (3.19) yields a relation of the form
(3.24)   zt    Et zt 1   Et[C(L)(Y ˆ
t 1   Y ˆ∗
t 1)]   ξ (qt   qt ∗)
between the evolution of the inﬂ  ation diﬀerential and the evolution of the 
output diﬀerential, where
C(L)  L2   [1       κ   ξ(1     1)]L    .
These two variables are also linked by the demand-  side equilibrium rela-
tion
(3.25)  Et zt 1   (ı t   ı t∗)      zt    y(Y ˆ
t   Y ˆ
t∗),
which follows from (1.30), when we recall that et   zt in this model. Condi-
tions (3.24) and (3.25) form a system of two equations per period to solve for 
the evolution of the inﬂ  ation diﬀerential and the output diﬀerential, given 
the paths of the exogenous disturbance {qt –   qt∗} and the policy diﬀerential 
{ı t –   ı t∗}. Combining the solution for world inﬂ  ation with the solution for 
the inﬂ  ation diﬀerential then yields a solution for inﬂ  ation in either country; 
for example,
(3.26)   t    t
w     zt.
Figure 1.7 illustrates the character of the solution for these two compo-
nents of inﬂ  ation, in the case of the same parameter values as are assumed in 
ﬁ  gure 1.6. The two lines in each panel indicate the way in which world inﬂ  a-
tion and relative inﬂ  ation respectively depend on the current and expected 
future values of the four forcing variables. To be precise, each panel decom-
poses the response of CPI inﬂ  ation to one of the forcing variables shown 
in ﬁ  gure 1.6 for the case     0.5 into two parts, corresponding to the two 
terms in (3.26): the eﬀect of the forcing variable on world inﬂ  ation (the 
solid line in each panel) and the eﬀect on   times relative inﬂ  ation (the dash-
 dotted line). (If we were to compute a similar decomposition of the inﬂ  ation 
responses for any other values of   than 0.5, the two components would be 
proportional to those shown in ﬁ  gure 1.7, but scaled by factors that depend 
55. This pair of equations has a determinate solution if and only if the Taylor rule coeﬃcients 
satisfy the “Taylor Principle” (Woodford 2003, Proposition 4.3), just as in a closed economy 
model. The solutions obtained for the evolution of world inﬂ  ation and world output are also 
exactly the same functions of the world disturbances as in the closed economy model.66    Michael  Woodford
on  .) Note that world inﬂ  ation is aﬀected to precisely the same extent by 
the forcing variables for each of the countries, while relative inﬂ  ation is 
aﬀected by the two countries’ forcing variables to the same extent but with 
the opposite sign.
While this approach to expressing the solution of the complete model has 
some convenient features, one should not conclude that the “global output 
gap” is accordingly a crucial determinant of inﬂ  ation in each country. Our 
observation about the possibility of writing a “global Phillips curve” rela-
tion (3.23) would be equally true in the case of complete autarchy, given our 
assumption of identical parameter values for the two countries (and our 
use of a log-  linear approximation). This might be a useful observation if 
one were interested in modeling the average world rate of inﬂ  ation rather 
than inﬂ  ation in a single country, but it would not imply any necessity or 
even convenience of using the concept of the “global output gap” to explain 
inﬂ  ation in one country.
Even in the case of two open economies, in the case that     1, we observe 
that κF   κ∗
H   0, so that the aggregate-  supply relation connects domestic 
inﬂ  ation in either country with economic activity in that country alone, 
as noted by CGG. As shown in section 1.1.2, the aggregate-  demand rela-
Fig. 1.7  Decomposition of the solution for home-  country inﬂ  ation into solutions 
for world inﬂ  ation and relative inﬂ  ation, shown for the case   0.5Globalization and Monetary Control    6 7
tions for each economy also connect domestic inﬂ  ation with domestic out-
put alone in that case, if we assume that monetary policy in each country 
responds only to the domestic inﬂ  ation rate. In this case, it is possible to 
solve equations (1.39), (1.41), and (3.19) for the evolution of the domestic 
endogenous variables { Ht, Y ˆ
t}, given the paths of the domestic endogenous 
variables {ı t, Y ˆ
t
n}, without any reference to either disturbances or policy 
in the foreign country. The solution obtained is the same as the one that 
would be obtained by solving for world average inﬂ  ation and the inﬂ  ation 
diﬀerential and summing them; but the latter, more roundabout method 
conceals the fact that foreign variables actually play no role in determining 
domestic inﬂ  ation.
In the more realistic case in which     1 and monetary policy responds to 
consumer price inﬂ  ation rather than to domestic inﬂ  ation alone, the struc-
tural equations for the two countries no longer perfectly decouple. Nonethe-
less, it remains the case that the mere fact that “global slack” determines the 
evolution of world inﬂ  ation through (3.23) does not mean that it will be the 
main determinant of inﬂ  ation in individual countries. The upper two panels 
of ﬁ  gure 1.7 (which relate to a case in which     1 and monetary policy in 
each country responds to CPI inﬂ  ation) show that the eﬀects of each coun-
try’s monetary policy on relative inﬂ  ation swamp the eﬀects on world inﬂ  a-
tion that are mediated by changes in the world output gap Y ˆ
t
w –   Y ˆ
t
nw. Hence 
the global slack thesis is quite misleading as a guide to understanding the 
eﬀects of monetary policy on an open economy.
Moreover, in the case in which     1, we observe that κF is negative, and 
thus opposite in sign to κH, contrary to what the “global slack” thesis would 
suggest.56 Moreover, κH is larger than the value κ   ξ(     – 1) that would 
be obtained in the case of a closed economy, and by more so the greater 
the degree of openness. We similarly ﬁ  nd that κ∗
H   0 and that κ∗
F is larger 
than the closed economy value. Hence the supposition on the basis of the 
global slack thesis that the Phillips curve trade-  oﬀ between domestic inﬂ  a-
tion and domestic real activity should be ﬂ  atter in a more open economy is 
not borne out.
In the previous paragraph I have considered only the nature of the Phillips 
curve trade-  oﬀ between domestic inﬂ  ation and domestic activity. If instead 
we are interested in the relation between CPI inﬂ  ation and domestic out-
put, then foreign activity aﬀects this relationship even in the case that     1, 
owing to its consequences for the terms of trade. However, the eﬀects of 
foreign activity on the domestic aggregate-  supply relation are again not of 
the kind suggested by the global slack thesis. The aggregate-  supply curve in 
this case is of the form
log P t   (κH    )Y ˆ
t   (κF    )Y ˆ
t∗,
56. The eﬀect of foreign output is in fact found often to be negative by Ihrig et al. (2007).68    Michael  Woodford
neglecting the terms corresponding to lagged values, disturbances, and 
expectations. In this case we have a further reason for openness to increase 
the (positive) slope of the AS curve (i.e., the sensitivity to domestic output), 
and also for openness to make the eﬀects of foreign output on domestic 
inﬂ  ation more negative; namely, the way in which both domestic and foreign 
output aﬀect the terms of trade. Thus, to the extent that this model repre-
sents the eﬀects of increased international integration of goods markets, 
there is no reason whatsoever to expect that globalization should reduce the 
sensitivity of domestic inﬂ  ation to domestic activity.
The global slack thesis is misleading in another respect as well. It sug-
gests that inﬂ  ationary pressure at home should depend not just on foreign 
economy, but on foreign activity relative to potential. This suggests that 
domestic monetary policy may need to be conditioned on changes in foreign 
potential output. This is one of the main reasons why Dallas Fed President 
Richard Fisher (2006) argues that globalized markets will make the conduct 
of monetary policy more diﬃcult. “How can we calculate an ‘output gap,’ ” 
he asks, “without knowing the present capacity of, say, the Chinese and 
Indian economies? How can we fashion a Phillips curve without imput-
ing the behavioral patterns of foreign labor pools?” But according to the 
previously developed model, the Phillips curve for an open economy does 
not involve foreign potential output or foreign labor supply behavior; the 
exogenous disturbance term qt involves only domestic technology and prefer-
ences regarding labor supply.57
In fact, foreign developments aﬀect domestic inﬂ  ation in this model solely 
through their eﬀects on the terms of trade. The aggregate-  supply relation 
(3.19) can alternatively be written in the form
(3.27)   Ht   κ(Y ˆ
t   Y ˆ
t
n)   κF log St    Et Ht 1,
where κ is the closed economy Phillips curve slope, Y ˆ
t
n is the closed economy 
“natural rate of output” (i.e., the equilibrium level of output in a closed 
economy model with ﬂ  exible prices, which depends only on domestic tech-
nology and preferences), and St indicates the terms of trade. The domes-
tic aggregate-  demand block (consisting of equations [1.39] and [1.41]) can 
similarly be written entirely in terms of domestic variables and the terms 
of trade; hence one can solve for the equilibrium paths { Ht, Y ˆ
t} purely as 
a function of domestic real fundamentals, domestic monetary policy, and 
57. This is somewhat hidden in the way that the national AS relations are written in Benigno 
and Benigno (2005). Domestic inﬂ  ation is written as being determined by a domestic output 
gap and a terms-  of-  trade gap, with the “natural” levels of both domestic output and the terms 
of trade being functions in turn of both qt and qt∗. Nonetheless, the domestic aggregate- supply 
equation actually involves only qt and not qt∗, as written here. Benigno and Benigno choose 
to write the AS relation in terms of their more complicated “gap” variables because of the 
role of those variables in their expression for the welfare-  based stabilization objective; writing 
the AS equations in terms of the same variables facilitates their characterization of optimal 
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the path of the terms of trade.58 The implied path of CPI inﬂ  ation, given a 
path for domestic inﬂ  ation, also depends only on the terms of trade. Thus, 
while it is true that a policy aimed at stabilizing domestic inﬂ  ation, CPI 
inﬂ  ation, and/ or domestic economic activity will need in general to monitor 
developments with regard to the terms of trade, it will not require a judg-
ment about foreign potential output, except to the extent that views about 
foreign fundamentals may help one to form a more accurate forecast of the 
future evolution of the terms of trade. Thus, the information requirements 
for using a Phillips curve model in the conduct of policy in an open economy 
are not as daunting as Fisher makes them sound.
Of course, the fact that foreign potential output does not enter the home 
country’s AS relation does not make it irrelevant to equilibrium determi-
nation in the home country, as shown by the lower right panel of ﬁ  gure 
1.6. This is because foreign potential output certainly does matter for the 
foreign AS relation, and hence for the determination of foreign output, 
inﬂ  ation, and interest rates, which variables aﬀect the home-  economy AD 
and AS relations. Nonetheless, while ﬁ  gure 1.6 indicates that variations in 
the foreign natural rate of output are of considerable consequence (when   
is large), if one wishes to attribute inﬂ  ation variations in the home economy 
to their various ultimate causes, it does not imply that a policymaker in the 
home country must concern herself with the estimation of foreign potential. 
In order to correctly understand the structural trade-  oﬀs facing the home 
economy, it suﬃces that one is able to forecast the evolution of foreign out-
put, inﬂ  ation, and interest rates; this is especially true in the case of a small 
economy, which cannot expect its own decisions to have any great eﬀect on 
the determination of output, inﬂ  ation, or interest rates elsewhere.
1.3.3      Consequences of Global Factor Markets
The previous section shows that there is no role for “global slack” as a 
determinant of supply- side inﬂ  ationary pressure in an open economy model 
where both ﬁ  nal goods markets and ﬁ  nancial markets are fully integrated, 
but factor markets are still nation- speciﬁ  c (or perhaps even more segmented). 
Proponents of the global slack thesis, however, are perhaps concerned with 
the consequences of global trade in factors of production as well. This could 
mean international integration of labor markets (as emphasized by those 
who assert that globalization has recently held down real wage demands in 
countries like the United States), or alternatively that internationally traded 
commodities or imported intermediate goods are important inputs in the 
domestic production technology, along with labor.
Because both the hypothesis of a global labor market and that of glob-
ally traded inputs of other kinds have similar consequences for the way the 
aggregate- supply relation will come to depend on domestic and foreign real 
58. Even the terms of trade are only relevant to the extent that   is not equal to 1.70    Michael  Woodford
activity, I shall here treat explicitly only the case of a global labor market. I 
shall also proceed immediately to the extreme case that is most favorable to 
the global slack thesis. This is the case in which there is only a single kind of 
homogeneous labor used in production in either country, and a competitive 
global market for the sale of that labor, so that households in one country 
can equally easily sell labor to ﬁ  rms in either country. I shall furthermore 
assume in this section that     1, so that there is no additional ﬁ  xed (and 
hence immobile) factor of production, and the marginal cost of production 
(in units of the world good) will depend only on the price of labor in the 
global market. In such a case, the marginal cost of production is necessarily 
identical worldwide, regardless of the relative levels of economic activity in 
the two countries.
The existence of a single global market for labor requires that
(3.28) 
W t  
P t




so that there is a common world price of labor in units of the world good. 
Labor supply in each country is still given by a function of the form (3.2), 
where the real wage is the common world real wage, and the labor employed 
in each country is still given by (3.7). Hence, clearing of the world labor 
market requires that
(3.29)  




   (1    )
Yt  
At




(Here I have used [3.28] and the fact that Ct   Ct∗ to simplify the left-  hand 
side expression for the world demand for labor.) Equations (3.28) and (3.29) 
replace the two labor-  market clearing conditions (one for each country) in 
the model with national labor markets that are obtained for each country 
by equating the right-  hand sides of (3.2) and (3.7).
Equation (3.29) can be solved for the world real wage as a function of real 
activity in the two countries. (Recall that one can use [1.15] to substitute for 
Ct.) Dividing the real wage by the productivity factor At (because we are now 
assuming a linear production function), we obtain the common marginal 
cost of production for each ﬁ  rm in the home country. One can again write 
marginal cost purely as a function of domestic goods prices and real vari-
ables by using (1.34) to substitute for Pt, yielding
(3.30)  MCt   
1
 
k1   1At
P HtYt
  (1  )  1Yt∗ (  1 1)
  
(1    )(Yt/At) t    (Yt∗/At∗) t∗
    
(1    )H  t    H t∗ 
 
.
This condition replaces (3.11) in the case of national labor markets.Globalization and Monetary Control    7 1
The corresponding equation for the marginal cost of production in the 
foreign country is given by
(3.31)  MCt∗   
1
 
k1   1At∗
P∗
FtYt
(1  )(  1 1)Yt∗(1  )    1
  
(1    )(Yt/At) t    (Yt∗/A∗
t) t∗
    
(1    )H t    H t∗ 
 
.
Note that even when we assume that there is a single world price for the 
unique factor of production (and a linear production function), it does not 
follow that real marginal cost must be the same in the two countries, if we 
measure real marginal cost in units of the composite domestic good (which 
is the concept of real marginal cost that measures the incentive for domestic 
price increases). Instead, MCt∗/  P∗
Ft, diﬀers from MCt/  P Ht, not only because of 
the (exogenous) productivity diﬀerential between the two countries, but also 
because of the terms of trade. The latter factor depends on the relative output 
of the two countries, and so can be aﬀected by national monetary policies.
Log-  linearizing (3.30) and substituting into (3.18), we obtain an open 
economy new-  Keynesian Phillips curve for the home economy, given by
(3.32)    Ht   κ(Y ˆ
t
w   Y ˆ
t
nw)   ξ (Y ˆ
t   Y ˆ
t∗)    Et Ht 1   ξ (at   at∗).
The corresponding aggregate-  supply relation for the foreign economy is 
given by
(3.33)   ∗
Ft   κ(Y ˆ
t
w   Y ˆ
t
nw)   ξ(1    )(Y ˆ
t   Y ˆ
t∗)    Et ∗
Ft 1 
  ξ(1    )(at   at∗).
Here, Y ˆ
t
w is the same measure of world average output as in (3.23).
Here we ﬁ  nd a role for the “global output gap” in determining the evolu-
tion of domestic inﬂ  ation in each country. Nonetheless, even in this most 
extreme case—when the marginal cost of production in either country 
depends solely on the common world price of a globally traded factor (apart 
from an exogenous country- speciﬁ  c productivity factor)—it does not follow 
that domestic monetary policy can exert no inﬂ  uence over the dynamics of 
domestic inﬂ  ation, even in the case of a very small country.
One observes that in the model with a global labor market, the equilibrium 
solution for home-  country inﬂ  ation is again of the form (3.22). Figure 1.8 
plots the coeﬃcients of this solution, in the same format as in ﬁ  gure 1.6, for 
an economy that is parameterized in the same way as in the earlier ﬁ  gure, 
except that there is now assumed to be a global labor market.59 Figure 1.8 is 
59. The same value of κ is assumed as in ﬁ  gures 1.6 and 1.7, even though, if we were instead 
to ﬁ  x the assumed parameters of the utility function, the assumption here is that     1 would 
imply a diﬀerent value of κ than the one in the Rotemberg-  Woodford model, which involves 
diminishing returns to labor.72    Michael  Woodford
quite similar to ﬁ  gure 1.6; the existence of a global market for all factors of 
production does not to any notable extent diminish the eﬀect of domestic 
monetary policy on home-  country inﬂ  ation.
Once again, the key to understanding the eﬀects of domestic monetary 
policy on inﬂ  ation in a small open economy is provided by a consideration 
of the relations that determine relative inﬂ  ation. If we subtract (3.33) from 
(3.32), we obtain
(3.34)   zt    Et zt 1   Et[A(L)(Y ˆ
t 1   Y ˆ∗
t 1)]   ξ(at   at∗),
where A(L) is again the lag polynomial deﬁ  ned in (1.50). Note that this rela-
tion does not require the inﬂ  ation diﬀerential to be zero, or even to evolve 
exogenously in a way determined purely by the evolution of the productivity 
diﬀerential. It also allows for variations in the inﬂ  ation diﬀerential to the 
extent that there are variations in the relative output of the two countries 
(owing to a terms-  of-  trade eﬀect), and the relative output levels depend 
on the monetary policies of the two countries. In the case that the Tay-
lor rule coeﬃcients are the same in both countries, equation (3.25) again 
applies, and equations (3.25) and (3.34) form a system of two equations per 
period to solve for the evolution of the inﬂ  ation diﬀerential and the output 
Fig. 1.8  Coeﬃcients of the solution (3.22) for inﬂ  ation, with a global labor marketGlobalization and Monetary Control    7 3
diﬀerential, given the paths of the productivity diﬀerential {at –  at∗} and the 
policy diﬀerential {ı t –   ı t∗}.
In the case of a very small country, monetary policy in the home country 
can have no noticeable eﬀect on the world average inﬂ  ation rate. But because 
domestic monetary policy can still aﬀect the inﬂ  ation diﬀerential, it can 
still aﬀect the domestic inﬂ  ation rate. (Note that none of the coeﬃcients in 
either [3.25] or [3.34] depend on  , so the eﬀects of policy on the inﬂ  ation 
diﬀerential obtained by solving these equations remains of the same size 
even if   approaches 1.) Figure 1.9 shows how this eﬀect accounts for the 
results plotted in ﬁ  gure 1.8 by decomposing the eﬀects shown in ﬁ  gure 1.8 
for the case     0.5 into eﬀects on world inﬂ  ation and on relative inﬂ  ation, 
respectively, using the same format as in ﬁ  gure 1.7. Even in the case that     
0.5, we observe that the eﬀects of the national monetary policies on relative 
inﬂ  ation dominate the eﬀects on world inﬂ  ation (at least at the short hori-
zons where the eﬀects of policy are largest); since the component of the total 
eﬀect that results from the eﬀect on relative inﬂ  ation grows in proportion to 
 , the result would be even more dramatic in the case of a larger value of   
(i.e., a smaller open economy).
Fig. 1.9  Decomposition of the solution for home-  country inﬂ  ation into solutions 
for world inﬂ  ation and relative inﬂ  ation, in the case of a global labor market74    Michael  Woodford
Nor is it necessarily true, even in the extreme case considered in this 
section, that global integration of markets reduces the slope of the Phil-
lips curve trade-  oﬀ between domestic inﬂ  ation and domestic output. One 
observes that in (3.32), the elasticity of domestic inﬂ  ation with respect to 
domestic output is equal to κ ˜H  κ(1 –    )   ξ  . This is smaller than the 
elasticity κH obtained for the open economy model with national factor 
markets (for the same value of   and all other parameters). However, it is 
not necessarily smaller than the Phillips curve slope κ that would obtain in 
the case of a closed economy. One ﬁ  nds that κ ˜H   κ if and only if      – 1   1, 
which need not be true. For example, it is not true under the calibration 
adopted by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) for the U.S. economy (where 
     – 1   0.3). I have already argued that it is realistic to assume that  – 1   1; 
thus one will have κ ˜H   κ for any small enough value of  , which is to say, 
in the case of suﬃciently elastic labor supply.60
Thus, even in the extreme case of a world market for all factors of produc-
tion, common interpretations of the “global slack” thesis would be valid to 
only a rather limited extent. While foreign economic activity aﬀects the Phil-
lips curve trade- oﬀ between domestic inﬂ  ation and domestic activity in such a 
model, the sign of the eﬀect of foreign output on domestic inﬂ  ation can easily 
be negative, the opposite of what the global slack thesis would suggest. (Note 
that κ ˜F    [κ –   ξ]   0 if      – 1   1.) Similarly, even if global integration 
means integration of factor markets as well as ﬁ  nal goods markets and ﬁ  nan-
cial markets, the slope of the Phillips curve trade- oﬀ can easily be increased by 
integration rather than being decreased. And certainly global integration of 
markets does not imply that domestic inﬂ  ationary pressure ceases to depend 
on domestic economic activity, so that it ceases to be possible for domestic 
monetary policy to inﬂ  uence the evolution of domestic inﬂ  ation. Even in 
this most extreme case, it remains possible to use monetary policy to stabilize 
inﬂ  ation, and this can be done by a national central bank of even a small 
country, without requiring coordination with other central banks.
1.4    Conclusion
All of the previously made arguments reach a similar conclusion: it is 
diﬃcult to think of plausible economic mechanisms through which globaliza-
tion should impair in any substantial way the ability of central banks to con-
trol domestic inﬂ  ation through national monetary policy. I have considered 
the consequences of potential increases in international integration of three 
60. In a closed-  economy model like that of Rotemberg and Woodford, v    – 1 measures the 
elasticity of the real wage with respect to an increase in output that is due to a purely monetary 
disturbance (i.e., that is not associated with a change in either preferences or technology). Thus 
if real wages rise less than in proportion to output, one may conclude that v    – 1   1. Typical 
estimates suggest that this is realistic; for example, the Vector Autoregression (VAR) study of 
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996) indicates a real wage response about one-  fourth 
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distinct types—ﬁ  nancial integration (including international risk-  sharing), 
goods market integration (including reduction in the share of home goods 
in a country’s consumption basket), and factor market integration—and 
I have considered the implications of these changes for three distinct links 
in the transmission mechanism for monetary policy: the relation between 
interest rates and the intertemporal allocation of expenditure, the means by 
which central bank actions aﬀect money- market interest rates, and the Phil-
lips curve relation between real activity and inﬂ  ation. It has proven diﬃcult 
to think of cases under which increased openness should lead either to a 
reduced eﬀect of domestic monetary policy on domestic aggregate demand 
or to any substantial reduction of the eﬀects of domestic economic activity 
on domestic inﬂ  ation, even when I have considered relatively extreme theo-
retical possibilities that go far beyond the degree of international integration 
that has yet been observed on any of these dimensions.
This does not mean that the degree of openness of an economy is of 
no signiﬁ  cance for the conduct of monetary policy. As shown previously, 
changes in the degree of goods market integration, represented by varia-
tion in the coeﬃcient   of preferences, aﬀect the quantitative speciﬁ  cation 
of both the aggregate-  demand and aggregate-  supply blocks of the simple 
models of the monetary transmission mechanism considered here; and there 
would be additional quantitative eﬀects of other types of potential changes 
that have not been taken up here.61 Furthermore, openness, to the degree 
that it is signiﬁ  cant, forces central bankers to confront a variety of practical 
issues that would not be present in the case of a closed economy, such as the 
question whether to stabilize an index of domestic prices only, or an index 
of the prices of all goods consumed in the domestic economy. And to the 
extent that the degree of international integration is thought to be chang-
ing especially rapidly at present or in the near future, this makes the issue of 
change over time in the correct quantitative speciﬁ  cation of the structural 
models used in a central bank a more pressing one to consider.
Nonetheless, globalization, even if expected to be rapid, does not seem 
to justify quite the degree of alarm that some commentators would urge 
upon central banks. When Richard Fisher (2006) declares that “the old 
models simply no longer apply in our globalized, interconnected and 
expanded economy,” one might imagine that a radical reconceptualization 
of the determinants of inﬂ  ation is needed, but I see no reason to expect this. 
Increased international trade in ﬁ  nancial assets, consumer goods, and fac-
tors of production should lead to quantitative changes in the magnitudes of 
61. For example, the theoretical analysis in this chapter deals only with the case in which con-
sumption baskets are identical in all parts of the world, which represents an extreme assumption 
of integration in one respect; in the case of “home bias” in countries’ consumption baskets, the 
structural relations would be somewhat diﬀerent. I have also considered only the case of a unit elas-
ticity of substitution between home and foreign goods, in which case ﬁ  nancial integration has no 
consequences for either the aggregate demand or aggregate supply block of the model; but with an 
elasticity of substitution not exactly equal to one, there would be some quantitative eﬀects (though 
no radical qualitative changes) of alternative degrees of international ﬁ  nancial integration.76    Michael  Woodford
various key response elasticities relevant to the transmission mechanism for 
monetary policy, but should not require fundamental reconsideration of the 
framework of monetary policy analysis. For example, it does not seem that 
notions such as “global liquidity” or “global slack” are particularly helpful 
in thinking about the main determinants of inﬂ  ation, even in the case of a 
very highly integrated world economy.
Above all, there is little reason to expect that globalization should elimi-
nate, or even substantially weaken, the inﬂ  uence of domestic monetary pol-
icy over domestic inﬂ  ation. Whatever the pace of globalization and however 
great its eventual extent may be, it should remain possible for a central bank 
with a consistent strategy directed to the achievement of a clearly formulated 
inﬂ  ation target to achieve that goal, without any need for coordination of 
policy with other central banks. Hence, it remains appropriate for central 
banks to be assigned responsibility for stabilizing a suitably chosen index of 
domestic prices—despite continuing changes in the real economy—whether 
domestic or foreign in origin.
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Comment  David Romer
This is an excellent chapter. The issue it addresses—whether globaliza-
tion has the potential to reduce or even eliminate the ability of a domestic 
central bank to inﬂ  uence domestic economic developments—is already 
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